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Introduction: Byrd’s Place in the Historiography of Modern Republican Conservativism 
“It is certainly a fact that the second rape of the South can be assuaged by selecting for President 
a Southerner and a Northerner as V.P. You seem to be the logical man…” J. S. Sheafe of 
Arizona proposed in a letter to Senator Harry Byrd Sr.1 In 1958, Byrd’s office was inundated 
with correspondence from determined conservatives across the nation who convinced Byrd to 
stay in the Senate in response to his retirement announcement after twenty-five years of service. 
American conservatives sought to find their place considering parties’ shifting ideological 
orientations. To some degree, Sheafe’s presidential ambitions for Byrd materialized when the 
senator was awarded eleven electoral points in 1960, making the already close contest between 
Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy that much more difficult for the national Democratic party. 
The Democratic party is still reckoning with the legacy of Harry Byrd today. 
On the floor of the Virginia State Senate during a debate over Harry Byrd’s statue on the 
capitol grounds, delegate Jay Jones of Norfolk recalled, “My father was denied entry to an 
elementary school a mile away from where he grew up because of Harry Byrd’s policies.” “I 
came [to the capitol] as a child for field trips,” Jones explained, “my father was a member of the 
General Assembly and having to walk by [the statue] with him, and I asked him ‘who is this 
man?’ and he choked up a little bit knowing [Byrd] didn’t want him to go to school in the public 
school system in Virginia.”2 In light of these recollections it is no surprise that Jones led the 
removal of Harry F. Byrd’s statue from the Virginia State Capitol grounds during the summer of 
2021. Pushing back against Jones’s efforts, Republican Senator Jill Vogel prompted her 
delegates to recall “the positive aspects of Byrd’s professional and political career, such as the 
 
1 J. S. Sheafe to Harry Byrd, February 15, 1958, Papers of Harry Flood Byrd, Sr., Accession #9700, 9700-b, Special 
Collections, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va. (Hereafter referred to as Papers of HFB Sr.) 
2 “Byrd Statue Removed from Capitol Square,” WTVR, July 7, 2021, https://www.wtvr.com/news/local-news/byrd-
statue-removed-from-capitol-square. 
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creation of the Shenandoah National Park and the growth of The Winchester Star newspaper.” 
Importantly, Vogel also “reminded the Senate that other Virginia leaders such as George 
Washington and Thomas Jefferson owned slaves.”3 This debate generated support from 
Republicans who advocated to keep a statue of a Democratic Senator that modern Democrats 
themselves wanted removed. Nearly a century of history, beginning with Harry Byrd’s first 
forays into politics, led up to this debate. His career complicates the narrative of Southern 
political party realignments. Despite some conservative opposition, the statue ultimately came 
down as quietly as Byrd rose to power. Sixty years after his death, Harry Byrd’s legacy remains 
contested, and this thesis will consider Byrd’s place in this history as a reluctant Republican, and 
nominal Democrat. 
 
A consideration of the life and politics of Senator Harry F. Byrd provides further evidence that 
some Southern legislators broke with the national Democratic Party as early as the 1940s and 
articulated the main tenets of contemporary Southern conservative politics. A consideration of 
the internal struggles of the Democratic Party in Virginia within the context of the broader 
political landscape highlights the significance of Byrd’s career in the Senate and his role in the 
national Democratic party. In addition, this thesis will consider why Senator Byrd decided to 
remain in the Democratic party for the entirety of his career when so many of his Southern 
colleagues were changing party affiliations. I maintain that while Byrd’s policies resembled that 
of a nominal Democrat and perhaps even a reluctant Republican, his political loyalty remained 
with the Democratic Party. Byrd’s political career married fiscal and social conservatism all the 
 
3 Bill Atkinson, “Statue of Virginia Politician, Segregation Champion Harry Byrd Sr. Will Leave Capitol Square,” 
Progress Index, https://www.progress-index.com/story/news/2021/02/23/va-senate-votes-remove-statue-
controversial-leader-capitol/4559473001/. 
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while facing pressure from those within his party to submit to the tide of liberalization that would 
sweep over the Democratic caucus during his time in the Senate. In much the same way that he 
would be caught in between the Democratic and Republican parties, Harry Byrd’s fiscal policies 
failed to shift across the decades as he moved from state to national government. In some ways 
Byrd’s anti-deficit anti-debt policies served as a Dixiecrat’s warning shot of fiscal conservative 
movements to come.  
In Politics of Rage, historian Dan Carter chronicles the political career of mid-twentieth 
century segregationist Alabama Governor George Wallace. Carter corroborates other historians 
who attribute “the Americanization of Dixie and the Southernization of America” to Wallace. 
Scholars have debated the significance of mid-to-late twentieth century segregationists such as 
Wallace, as well as Senators Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Barry Goldwater of 
Arizona in the migration of conservative Southern votes to the Republican Party. This thesis 
casts Byrd as one of the most influential Southern congressmen of the twentieth century, who 
held a considerable national profile during his time. Byrd has been overlooked, particularly in 
recent historical literature. A re-examination of Byrd’s career enriches our understanding of 
some Southern legislators’ departure from the national Democratic Party as early as the 1940s.   
In recent years historians have revisited the narrative of the Southern political shift that 
took place during the 1960s resulting in Republican Party dominance in the South and reversing 
decades of Democratic Party rule. Rather than a sudden shift of the late fifties and early sixties, 
many scholars have traced the roots of this change to the New Deal Era. In Racial Realignment, 
Eric Shickler examines the liberalization of the Democratic party under the Roosevelt 
administration in the wake of New Deal’s transformative policies. In response to the evolving 
racial demographics of the party, Southern segregationists increasingly relied on states’ rights 
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rhetoric to prevent the implementation of New Deal policies. I argue that Senator Byrd’s break 
from the Truman administration marks this beginning of the evolving political culture. After 
Truman’s 1948 campaign Byrd would break with the national party when undermining his 
candidacy in Virginia. Senator Byrd’s criticism of the Truman administration’s expansion of the 
U.S. federal government, particularly regarding civil rights and budgetary expenditures at home 
and abroad, integrated fiscal and social conservatism. In The Dixiecrat Revolt, historian Kari 
Frederickson chronicles Southern resistance against the national Democratic party in 1948. 
Unlike Byrd, some Southerners wanted to split from the Democratic party completely and form a 
third party, but Fredrickson explains that the Southern bloc was not powerful enough within 
national politics to advance Southern priorities without the aid of the Democratic party. 
 In Chain Reaction, Thomas and Mary Edsall trace the rise of the conservative voting 
coalition at the expense of the Democratic party. It credits the Republican party’s ability to 
exploit racial divisions within the Democratic party as a factor to its rise to power.4 In Fear 
Itself, Ira Katznelson examines the New Deal and its effects on Democratic party politics and 
American politics at large. Katznelson maintains that the Roosevelt administration attempted to 
hold the Democratic party together through a “pragmatic forgetfulness with regard to racial 
matters” but ultimately failed to unite unmoved conservative Southern Democrats with the 
growing liberal factions of the Democratic party.5 As the head of Virginian politics and as a 
respected Southern Senator during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, he led Democratic 
infighting during the late 1930s and early 1940s.   
 
4 Thomas Byrne Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New York: 
Norton, 1991). 
5 Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, First edition. (New York: Liveright 
Publishing Corporation, 2013), 168. 
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Senator Byrd’s debt-reduction, a conservative stance on fiscal issues, echoes the twenty-
first century Republican Party program. With the rise of the Taxed Enough Already (TEA) 
movement and its sudden grip on Republican Party politics, some of Senator Byrd’s staunchest 
early political beliefs found traction with a much wider national political base fifty years after his 
death. Most of Byrd’s contemporaries perceived these fiscal policies as penny-pinching. His 
cohesive fiscal agenda predates modern Republican conservative policies. The support Senator 
Byrd received in his later career, not only from Virginians, but from conservatives across the 
nation illustrates the way that Southern conservatism would capture a national audience. The 
outpouring of letters Byrd received imploring him not to retire in 1958 and the possibility of a 
Goldwater-Byrd independent ticket in 1960 highlight the ways in which conservatives outside 
the South supported Byrd’s conservatism across party lines. 
In “Of Byrds and Bumpers,” historians M. V. Hood, Quentin Kidd, and Irwin Morris 
identified a combination of Democratic-push and Republican-pull theories that explain the 
Republican domination of Southern politics. Hood, Kidd, and Morris argue that “Black 
mobilization within the Democratic party” and Republican conservatism pressured white 
Southern Democrats to move toward the Republican voters.6 They argue it was a combination of 
these factors that caused the shift. These historians maintained that racial and economic shifts 
triggered both the liberalization of the Democratic Party and the growing inter-party competition 
between the Democratic and Republican parties in the South. Senator Byrd’s political career 
helps write the narrative of how Virginia, a state with little inter-party competition but a 
prolonged intra-party power struggle fits into these themes. In the decades following 
 
6 M. V. Hood, Quentin Kidd, and Irwin L. Morris, “Of Byrd[s] and Bumpers: Using Democratic Senators to 
Analyze Political Change in the South, 1960-1995,” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (1999): 465–87, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2991802. 
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Reconstruction Virginia would be dominated by the Democratic party, however, prior to Byrd, it 
had a history of machine boss politicians attempting to assert control. The most notable example 
of this was the machine of Byrd’s mentor Senator Thomas Martin. 
The way Harry Byrd chose to wield his political power remains underexplored in the 
scholarly literature. At a time of heightened debate and contest over the constitution, it is 
important to recognize that political organizations have historically subverted regional 
constitutions to consolidate power. Motives like efficiency and taxpayer savings were touted 
during the Byrd upheavals of the Virginia state constitution, but these masked the true aim to 
consolidate power in the governorship which Byrd would either hold himself or control by proxy 
for most of his career. Byrd’s rhetoric exploited fears of “socialism” when it came to labor 
organization and civil rights issues. By suggesting a drift towards autocracy in the American 
government, Byrd helped preserve his base of power and support in Virginia. Byrd certainly 
evolved during his career of public service, but more than that, the unique and deeply regional 
form of politics Byrd conducted led him to often be at odds with national labels and political 
categorizations. Whether it was in his blending of capitalist, progressive, and conservative 
politics at the state level, or his marriage of fiscal and social conservatism with Democratic party 
loyalty and progressive pet projects at the national level, Harry Byrd defied political labels. His 
position as a party-boss allowed him to wander in a political desert with little fear of voter 
reprisal at times when his colleagues were not so fortunate. 
In Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, Ronald Heinemann offers a comprehensive biographical 
narrative of Senator Byrd’s political career. My research diverges from Heinemann’s assessment 
of Byrd’s later career and overall impact. Heinemann underplays the importance of Byrd as a 
Southern Senator. This thesis seeks to illustrate that in his interactions with grassroots 
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Republicans and Democratic administrations, Byrd was a critical figure at a time of great 
transformation for Southern politics. James Sweeney’s work on Byrd considers the Virginian’s 
life and career, recounting parts of Senator Byrd’s nearly half-century in the role in politics. 
Sweeney’s account traces the evolution of the public reception of conservative Southern 
Democrats including Byrd. In his thesis “Byrd and the Anti-Byrd” considers responses to Byrd’s 
policies among his Virginian constituents and those who campaigned against the Byrd 
Organization in Virginia including liberal Democrats and Republicans. 
Scholars have also addressed Byrd’s contemporaries who acted as Byrd’s loyal foot 
soldiers in Virginia while others vehemently opposed his “reign” over the Democratic party 
organization. Understanding the Southern Democrats that shaped the political landscape around 
Byrd can be revealing and help unpack some of the differences between Byrd and his major mid-
century segregationist counterparts, such as Alabama Governor George Wallace. Historian 
Elizabeth Atwood’s 2013 article ‘“Dear Harry” documents the evolution of the friendship 
between James Kilpatrick Jr. and Senator Byrd over the last decade and a half of his tenure in the 
Senate. Her work reveals a great deal about Senator Byrd’s attitude towards journalists as 
individuals, and the press as an institution. Having formerly been the editor of his father’s local 
paper the Winchester Star (a position which he would in turn pass to his son shortly after his 
election to the Senate), Byrd had experience as a journalist himself.  However, Atwood’s 
analysis of his relationship with Kilpatrick asserts that by the time Byrd became a public official 
himself, his views shifted from a businessman who saw journalism to make money, to a 
politician interested in seeing compliance on the editorial pages of Virginia newspapers. Byrd 
was certainly not the first politician to demand journalists’ favorable coverage, but the Kilpatrick 
case is of note because of Byrd’s outsized influence over the state Democratic party in Virginia. 
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Byrd’s sway over Virginia politics could make or break a journalist’s career. Though their 
communications were always cordial, Atwood exposes the mutual benefits this relationship 
between Kilpatrick and Byrd brought.7 
Other scholars have focused on the opposition to Byrd within Virginia. For instance, 
historian George Lewis examines Louise Oftedal Wensel’s run as an independent candidate 
against Byrd during the 1958 Senatorial election. The 1958 senatorial campaign in Virginia was 
a landmark year for Byrd. After what would have been twenty-five years in the United States 
Senate, Byrd announced his retirement on account of the illness of his wife Anne. However, 
following a flood of constituent correspondence from both Virginians and conservative 
Americans who saw Byrd as a potential bastion against the growingly liberal national 
Democratic party, Byrd decided to run for a fifth term as the senator from Virginia. Despite the 
positive constituent response, popularity for the Byrd organization (where it ever truly existed in 
the first place) was already waning. An aging Byrd did not keep up with the changing political 
landscape that led even Virginia Democrats to embrace a more liberal candidate.  
Soon after Byrd died, Virginia saw its first liberal governor in decades. Governor 
Linwood Holton attempted to reverse many of the segregationist policies of the Byrd 
Organization. Governor Holton was a Republican but following his term, a conservative faction 
overtook the Virginia Republican party which was bolstered by Byrd Organization members who 
changed party affiliation. It is likely that Harry Byrd Jr.’s official separation from the Democratic 
party led to this shift. Holton’s successor Mills Godwin was a standard bearer for the Republican 
Byrd cronies. In this way, Harry Byrd Sr.’s effect on Virginian politics can be seen even after his 
 
7 Elizabeth Atwood, “‘Dear Harry,’ ‘My Dear Jack’: The Evolving Friendship between James J. Kilpatrick, Jr., and 
Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Sr., 1949–66,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 121, no. 4 (2013): 372. 
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death, and Byrd himself was a significant contributor to keeping conservative Virginians in the 
Democratic party until the early 1970s.8 
Wensel’s candidacy against Senator Byrd came at a time of growing unrest over civil 
rights. When she filed her candidacy, she cited the massive resistance crises, as the school 
closings protesting integration in Virginia would come to be known, saying “Byrd’s handling of 
the school crisis was very unfortunate” and that she would like to see the schools kept open.9 
Unlike Wensel, Byrd was an unyielding segregationist. Though understanding that her odds were 
slim as an independent and an educated woman running for office in the conservative state of 
Virginia, Wensel campaigned with conviction, withstanding much of the intolerance slung at her, 
by the Democrats and the Byrd Organization. She garnered over twenty-five percent of the vote 
across the state. These results undercut electoral predications and sent a warning shot to the well-
established Byrd organization. In many ways, this election signaled the first crack in the Byrd 
machine. Though much of the Organization’s waning can be tied to Senator Byrd’s growing 
senility, Wensel’s campaign highlights that despite the prevalence of segregationist voters, 
Byrd’s political vision jeopardized the conservative stronghold he once established. Lewis notes 
the “49.3 percent increase since the 1954 Senate race” in voter turnout.10 This is important 
because it shows that although Wensel may not have been victorious in the election, she 
succeeded in increasing voter turnout. Wensel cited low voter turnout as one the electoral 
foundations of the Byrd machine. In October of 1958, she maintained: “There are 950,000 
 
8 John C. McGlennon, “Virginia’s Changing Politics,” in The South’s New Politics: Realignment and Dealignment, 
by Robert H. Swansbrough and David M. Brodsky (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 
1988), 57–58. 
9 “Senator Byrd Has Opponent", Lebanon News (Lebanon, Virginia), 31 July 1958, Virginia Chronicle: Digital 
Newspaper Archive, https://virginiachronicle.com/?a=d&d=LN19580731.1.1&srpos=3&e=-------en-20--1--txt-txIN-
louise+oftedal+wensel-------. 
10 George Lewis, “‘Any Old Joe Named Zilch’? The Senatorial Campaign of Dr. Louise Oftedal Wensel,” The 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 107, no. 3 (1999): 316. 
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registered voters in Virginia. About 250,000 of them are usually drawn in by the Byrd machine. 
My problem is to get those 700,000 who stay at home on election day to show their protest for 
Byrd by voting for me.”11 
Historian Glenn Feldmann’s essay collection Painting Dixie Red addresses the electoral 
shift away from the Democratic party and towards Republicanism in the South. The scholars 
featured in Feldmann’s edited volume present opposing viewpoints about the push-pull theories, 
and the various strategies that helped Republicans win the South. Eisenhower’s suburban 
strategies, which reveal that he likely had an eye toward making political inroads in the entire 
South and his friendship with Senator Byrd, only aided in this mission. It was during 
Eisenhower’s candidacy that Byrd began his practice of “Golden Silence” (which he continued 
in future presidential races until his death in 1966), a refusal to endorse either the Republican or 
Democratic presidential ticket. Years later, in his review of J. Harvie Wilkinson’s Harry Byrd 
and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics in Clinch Valley College’s student newspaper the 
Highland Cavalier, Ron Farmer explained, “These so-called ‘golden silences’ had angered many 
Virginians who had come to believe that if Virginia was to get into the mainstream of American 
life it was to do so by sticking closely to the national party.”12  Conversely national Republicans, 
including President Eisenhower’s staff, would praise Byrd for helping create “balance” during 
the president’s term in office, singling him out as particularly helpful among his Democratic 
colleagues. As chairman of the Senate Finance Committee during Eisenhower’s time in the 
White House, Byrd did not always see eye to eye with the president, but Eisenhower’s budgets 
 
11 “’Quite a Revelation,’ View of Dr. Wensel”, Suffolk News-Herald (Suffolk, VA), 23 October 1958 — Virginia 
Chronicle: Digital Newspaper Archive,”, https://virginiachronicle.com/?a=d&d=SNH19581023.1.1&srpos=4&e=---
----en-20--1--txt-txIN-louise+oftedal+wensel-------. 
12 “Cavalier's Corner Reader's Choice: Byrd, Past and Present", Highland Cavalier (Clinch Valley College, Wise, 
Virginia), 30 August 1971 — Virginia Chronicle: Digital Newspaper Archive,” 
https://virginiachronicle.com/?a=d&d=HLC19710830.1.4&srpos=4&e=-------en-20--1--txt-txIN-
golden+silence+byrd-------. 
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were the closest to his satisfaction of any executive plans during his time in the Senate. And, in 
the areas where the Eisenhower administration did grow the federal budget, Byrd was willing to 
concede support due to the military necessities brought on by the Korean war. Byrd’s support for 
the national military programs revealed his embrace of fiscal and social conservatism. Byrd 
campaigned against programs that would have aided the least privileged and helped racial 
minorities economically advance. Not only did Harry Byrd support the racial segregation but he 
opposed programs that would have attempted to close the economic gap between white and 
Black Americans.  
More broadly, however, Feldmann’s collection of essays provides insight into what it 
means to have been “Southern” during the twentieth century. First, the support for military 
endeavors, which has its roots in the “still fighting the Civil War” mentality.13 The glorification 
of the “Lost Cause” narrative in the wake of the Civil War, which reached a crescendo during 
Senator Byrd’s time in politics, helped consolidate the old Confederacy together into one 
political landscape. Secondly, Feldmann characterizes the South as a conservative, and 
increasingly reactionary throughout the twentieth century. He points out that as the overall 
liberalization of the United States increased, Southern reactionaries grew more entrenched. 14 As 
demonstrated by his orchestration of the massive resistance crisis, his deficit-hawk financial 
policies, and romanticization of Virginia’s (and the South’s) place in American history, Byrd 
fashioned himself to be among those reactionaries longing to return to a time gone by, that 
perhaps never really was. 
 
13 David Goldfield, Still Fighting the Civil War: The American South and Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2002). 
14 Glenn Feldman, Painting Dixie Red: When, Where, Why, and How the South Became Republican, New 
Perspectives on the History of the South (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011).12. 
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Feldmann also points to a stagnant South that resisted growth and rejected nation-wide 
changes. He claims that the Republican Party and the United States shifted towards alignment 
with the South following the increasingly liberal Democratic party stranding its conservative 
wing and the intra-party struggle that ultimately ended in the triumph of reactionaries and 
evangelicals over the moderate wing of the Republican party. Byrd’s brand of politics would be 
among those left behind by the Democratic party, and he inched closer to the Republican party 
(and visa versa) throughout his career. Feldmann maintains, “The South did not move so much 
as the nation did.”15 In other words, the larger cultural struggle behind the Republican capture of 
the South resulted in the Southernization of American values rather than the other way around. 
The outpouring of letters Byrd received from Republicans nationally imploring him not to retire 
in 1958 and stressing the ways in which they felt he represented their interests in the Senate even 
if they were not his constituents highlight the ways in which conservatives outside the South 
supported Byrd’s conservatism across party lines, and the ways Byrd would be more in line with 
Republicans around the nation than many of his own constituents by his last term in the Senate. 
Understanding the political landscape surrounding Senator Byrd and his role in it 
provides broader context of the party realignment in the South. Much of the latter half of Byrd’s 
time in the Senate was consumed with as much infighting and obstructionism within the 
Democratic party as opposition to the Republican party. In fact, one of the questions this thesis 
seeks to answer is why Senator Byrd remained in the Democratic party at all, particularly at that 
time during his career when progressives distanced themselves from conservatives within their 
own circles. Any party seeking to win white Southern votes had to align its values with the 
South. As the Republican party made inroads into the South, Senator Byrd, though an unyielding 
 
15  Feldman, Painting Dixie Red, 321. 
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and aging partisan, served as a model to those who sought to capitalize on the votes of white old 
Southern Conservative Democrats who embraced the vein of Southern conservatism and would 
successfully succeed him in the years and decades to come. 
Senator Byrd remains an under-considered political figure in the historical narrative of 
the downfall of the Democratic party in the South. Though no one politician could have kept the 
Southern stronghold within the Democratic ranks, Byrd represented a prominent Southern state 
and was among those who led the conservative faction of the Democratic party that refused to 
submit to the party’s wave of liberalization. Byrd would not officially leave the Democratic party 
in his lifetime, but his membership hindered the national party as the party’s priorities shifted 
away from his own. Byrd scholars tend to embrace a “eulogy” approach that celebrates his 
accomplishments and mainly focuses on narrow aspects of his political career without 
acknowledging how his vision and actions shaped the course of the Democratic Party. In the five 
years following his death, scholars praised the personal character and ambition of Senator Byrd, 
while overlooking some of the political aims. This research aims to situate Byrd within the 
context of the evolution of his entire political career as well as the broader shifting political 
landscape of his time. There are key issues such as civil rights and fiscal policy where Byrd 
broke most sharply with the liberal faction of the Democratic party, but these issues should be 
considered within the context of his entire career for a fuller understanding of Byrd’s place in 
Democratic party politics and Republican Party ascendency. 
This research takes a broader look at Senator Byrd’s role in shaping the political 
landscape in the South by shedding new light on Senator Byrd’s nearly half-century in political 
office through two previously unexamined historical lenses. First, this work considers Senator 
Byrd’s life and domination of Virginia’s state politics in light of the downfall of the regional 
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Southern Democratic dominance, and the national party polarization between conservative and 
liberal factions into the Republican and Democratic parties respectively. Second, this work 
considers the way in which Byrd represented Southern politicians and businessmen through his 
conservative vision. At a time when American politics generally underwent great upheaval and 
change, Senator Byrd tied his principles and political works to some of the most conservative 
elements in national politics, and thus has proven Feldman’s point about the fundamental and 
unmovable conservative tendency of Southern politics.16 As displayed in the pressure placed on 
Byrd to remain in the Senate in 1958 and the electoral results of the 1960, Byrd’s conservatism 
would draw supporters from across the South and across the nation. At a grassroots level, 
Republicans urged Byrd to carry out his conservate policies and make a run for the White House. 
All the while, he quietly clung to the Democratic Party to wield his influence over Virginia, and 
to retain his power in national politics.  
 
The Early Byrd 
This section chronicles the evolution from state politician in his early career to national politician 
in his later career. First, he became demonstrably more conservative on racial and social issues 
from his time passing progressive legislation in the Virginia State Senate to his time in the U.S. 
Senate during which he opposed welfare expansion of the federal government and civil rights 
legislation. Secondly, during his time in office at the state level, particularly as governor in the 
late 1920s, he focused on making the state government more fiscally efficient thereby lowering 
the tax burden on Virginians. However, following the Second World War, as a senator, he turned 
his attention to balancing the budget to benefit the economy. During his time in United States 
 
16 Feldman, Painting Dixie Red, 321. 
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Senate, Byrd increasingly relied on obstructionism, and he buried his head in the sand on many 
of his more anachronistic policies, including his railing against almost every increase in 
government expenditures following the Second World War. 
Harry Byrd hailed from neither a particularly wealthy, nor particularly poor family, but 
one with long roots in Virginia state history.17 By virtue of being raised in rural turn-of-the-
century Virginia, biographers describe Byrd’s upbringing as modest. Perhaps, Byrd’s fiscal 
policy and his rejection of policies that were born out of his experience coming of age at a time 
when Virginia was burdened by massive debt. It is also clear that he was influenced by his 
father, a Democrat, who was a moderately successful businessman and already imbued the Byrd 
name with prestige through his rise in state politics.18 His father and family name opened many 
doors for Byrd’s career in state politics. His first public position began as an editor in 1903 with 
the family newspaper The Winchester Star.   
Virginius Dabney, a fellow journalist, editor of the Richmond Times-Dispatch and 
occasional critic of the Byrd organization, eulogized Byrd history noting “young Byrd, aged 15, 
turned the bankrupt Winchester Star into a profitable paper. This achievement foreshadowed the 
extraordinary career of a man who, by his high character, practical sense, indomitable energy, 
and great ability became Virginia’s political leader for forty years.”19 Byrd pulled the paper out 
of debt and would even expand its scope and readership by continuing to buy and establish other 
newspapers in the Shenandoah valley. This method of expansion was characteristic of his early 
forays into state politics. However, it seems that rather than developing a journalist’s 
 
17 Feldman, Painting Dixie Red, 321. 
18 Alden Hatch, The Byrds of Virginia, 1st ed. (Virginia: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 401–2,  
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investigative approach of government and institutions, Byrd drew on his experience as a 
businessman in shaping his desire for government efficiency and centralization. 
Byrd inherited a place in state politics from the stature of his father, Richard Byrd, as 
Speaker of the Virginia State House of Delegates.20 Harry Byrd was his father’s immediate 
successor in the House of Delegates in 1915.21 He had made a name for himself as President of 
the Valley Turnpike Company, a toll highway, which would spark his interest in the expansion 
and funding of highways at the state level.  
During his term in the House of Delegates, he helped form the Byrd organization. Much 
of the infrastructure of the early Byrd Organization would be inherited from the “Martin 
Machine.” Machine politics dominated Virginia since the early 1890s and the rise of the 
Bourbon Democrats. In Harry Byrd’s early forays into state politics, U.S. Senator Thomas 
Martin, a Byrd family friend, would serve as his mentor. Having inherited both the Flood and 
Byrd political lineages, Harry Byrd was in an ideal position to assume leadership of this 
Organization upon Martin’s death in 1919. Byrd carried over the Martin Machine into the Byrd 
Organization. The Organization dominated Virginia politics, particularly during Byrd’s time as 
governor.22 
One of Byrd’s most significant political missions and first major accomplishments of his 
career was the pay-as-you-go roads plan. This plan ensured that the people of Virginia received 
the government services they needed. In this way, the plan represented a hallmark of the 
“Progressive Byrd” who was willing to expand the scope of state government to give Virginians 
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necessary services. This Byrd stood in stark contrast with the conservative U.S. Senator Byrd he 
would become. Byrd’s position as a toll road manager revealed the deeply capitalistic nature of 
the plan. Byrd advocated for raising the taxes of Virginians. To pay for the expansion of the 
highway system in Virginia an extra cent would be levied in the gas tax. This increase in taxation 
was so minimal that it seemed like a fair trade to many Virginians. The Pay-As-You-Go roads 
plan was one of the many areas, especially in his early career, where it is difficult to fit Byrd into 
one political category or another.  
Richmond-News Leader writer and future Poet-Laureate of Virginia, Carter Wormeley 
wrote “The gas tax is of only a nominal cost to the state at a fraction over one-tenth of one 
percent.”23 Wormely’s opposition to Byrd’s tax policies, at least early in his political career, was 
not necessarily against taxation. Rather he preferred regressive taxation such as a gas tax, or 
sales tax, to a progressive income or property tax.  
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Figure 1: Gasoline Tax Map from J. B. Burch24 
Most Southern states did not adopt regressive taxation policies until after the Great 
Depression during which they were forced to choose between accepting federal aid and raising 
taxes to fund their governmental services themselves. The fear that federal funds would cede 
power to a growingly liberal federal government led most states to abscond federal funds but 
retained clauses in their own state constitutions that allowed levying higher property taxes 
extremely difficult. Thus, Southern legislators decided to levy regressive sales taxes, which 
placed much of the burden on the already impoverished, to fund their governments. In Figure 1, 
the map, published by the National Petroleum Marketers Association Byrd, lays out the gasoline 
taxes by state. Byrd’s confidant J. B. Burch pointed out that raising the gasoline tax put Virginia 
as a competitive disadvantage with its border states. In fact, Burch was worried that if the tax 
were to get to five cents a gallon, Virginians, who lived on the border, would purchase to their 
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gasoline in border states, and thereby significantly diminish the taxable sales of gasoline in 
Virginia. This map and Burch’s commentary show that Virginia was stepping toward regressive 
taxation even more than many of its Southern contemporaries. Byrd’s Pay-As-You-Go 
legislation represented a form of taxation and government funding that became prominent 
throughout the South nearly a decade later, marking an early split between the fiscal concerns of 
Southerners and national Democrats. Though he supported progressive infrastructure services, 
Harry Byrd showed that even before he took up residence in the governor’s mansion that he had 
his finger on the pulse of white Southern politics and was often several steps ahead of his 
Southern contemporaries who would eventually turn to these policies after the modern 
Republican Party gained power.  
Byrd would use the Pay-As-You-Go Roads plan as a steppingstone towards greater 
ambitions. Inheriting his father’s mantle of statewide prominence, Byrd began to assemble a 
coalition to take over the governor’s mansion in the election of 1925. Much of the hierarchical 
political infrastructure that shaped his Byrd machine he inherited from his uncle Henry Flood 
who served in the U.S. House of Representatives and was himself a foot soldier in the political 
patronage system of the U.S. Senator, and former Confederate, Thomas Martin. In many ways 
the Martin system under which Harry Byrd cut his teeth in politics in the 1910s expedited his 
early career in politics and allowed him to rise to prominence statewide, first as Chairman of the 
Virginia State Democratic party and later as Governor at an exceptionally young age. Indeed, 
Harry Byrd would go on to become the youngest Governor of Virginia since Thomas Jefferson a 
man for whom he had so much admiration. In 1926, shortly after his election, Byrd would speak 
at Monticello marking the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. 
He said, “More than others, a Governor of Virginia cannot feel that Mr. Jefferson is a remote 
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historic patronage for he was my predecessor when he was only thirty-six years old, he planned 
much of the building where the people for a season permit me to do my work and I am 
accustomed to pass frequently his figure in marble.” Byrd linked himself as a political and 
ideological descendent of Jefferson and it seems that the role of Jefferson the Virginian in laying 
the foundation for the Democratic party shaped his views of the party’s place in white Southern 
heritage. Byrd further noted: “[Jefferson’s] hostility to the privileges of many prominent 
personages and his advanced perhaps sometimes mistaken ideas draw down upon him a torrent 
of natural but unfair abuse: abuse that distorted the historic portrait of this amazing man.”25 The 
effects of his inherited power and connections which culminated in the Byrd Organization 
manifested as a defining reason for Byrd’s over thirty years in the U.S. Senate. 26 
Byrd inherited his statewide name recognition from his family. However, his advocacy 
for the development of state highway systems all the while shifting the state government away 
from further bond issuing resonated with his Virginian constituents and allowed him to forge his 
own path. In what was thought to be a defeat for the Byrd organization, the Pay-As-You-Go 
roads plan went to a ballot measure in 1922. Byrd’s anti-bond, anti-debt campaigning received a 
mandate from Virginia voters in the form of a “substantial: 127,187 to 81,220.”27 Byrd’s true 
political savvy became evident when launching himself into statewide office. He rewrote the 
Virginia state constitution in ways that would ultimately minimize the power of Virginian voters 
over the Byrd Organization. Following his chairmanship of the state Democratic party in 1922, 
Byrd put into place restrictions on voting requirements in Democratic primaries that were 
ultimately beneficial to the Byrd machine. 
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These restrictions on access to voting in Democratic primaries represents one of the first 
clear examples that the Byrd machine relied on low voter turnout and suppression of African 
American voters to maintain its power. In addition to distancing himself from these policies in 
years to come, Byrd became a victim of this restriction when the Republican party gained power 
during the final decades of his career. When the political landscape changed and many 
Republicans had no real ideological reasons to separate themselves from Byrd, they based their 
opposition to him on his machine-style Byrd Organization politics. This is seen in the 1958 
campaign of Dr. Louise Oftedal Wensel which likened Byrd’s dominance over the Democratic 
party in Virginia to Soviet Russia. She said, “Unless someone comes forward to be Republican 
candidate for the United States Senate, Virginians like Russians will have only one choice in the 
next election.”28 Virginia’s partisan Republicans opposed the Byrd machine on the grounds of 
the problematic way the Byrd Organization sought to control politics.   
 
Byrd’s Years as Governor 
During the 1920s, the Virginia Democratic party dominated in state’s politic landscape. As Byrd 
consolidated his power over the Virginian Democratic party, the 1925 Gubernatorial race 
increasingly appealed to Byrd. As a result, he decided to launch a campaign against Progressive 
G. Walter Mapp. This race for governor would sharpen the divide between the efficiency-based 
policies of the Byrd Organization and the Progressive services and values of non-Organization 
Democrats. While Mapp’s progressive supporters hoped to expand the state government’s 
capabilities to provide quality-of-life improvements to its citizens, the Byrd faction campaigned 
on reforming a state government in disarray as a means of aiding Virginians. Byrd sought to 
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centralize the government of Virginia and streamline the organizational hierarchy to answer to 
the executive. In short, he felt the government of Virginia would operate more efficiently if it 
operated more like a business, with the Virginian voters as its shareholders. Reducing the debt by 
cutting governmental departments was a key priority for Byrd in making the government of 
Virginia more efficient. 
To implement changes, he proposed multiple amendments to the state constitution. Byrd 
adopted many of the same tactics of consolidating power as a governor from his tenure as 
Chairman of the Democratic Party. When the politics of his state were not conducive to 
Organization priorities or jeopardized its control, he simply changed the rules of the game. 
Governor Byrd appointed Robert Prentis, the president of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
to chair a commission investigating necessary constitutional amendments that might make the 
Virginia state government more efficient. In addition to the Prentis Commission, he also 
appointed longtime political ally and Organization leader Billy Reed to head a committee of 
businessmen to submit their recommendations of changes to the structure of the Virginia state 
government.29 Byrd often spoke of his approach to executive leaders in the state like that of a 
businessman running a corporation. Within the first few months of Byrd’s time as governor he 
contracted an out-of-state agency, the New York Municipal Bureau, to conduct a professional 
review of the Virginia state government and recommend areas in which it could be governed 
more efficiently. For years Byrd had attempted to amend the Virginia state constitution to 
increase the appointment power of the governor.  
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The New York Bureau went much farther in its suggestions of state overhaul than the 
Byrd organization initially anticipated. Though it seemed that the two groups’ goals were in line 
at the start of Governor Byrd’s term (given Byrd’s control over state politics), the degree to 
which he was personally involved in seeking reformist groups suggests that he would have 
chosen the group he felt would most likely recommend the changes he had in mind. The Prentis 
and Reed commissions only recommended to the Virginia General Assembly the changes they 
decided were most useful to the Byrd Organization including financial reforms that bolstered 
Byrd’s arguments for the effectiveness of his fiscal policies and consolidation of certain state 
bureaus. However, as Laurence J. O’Toole explains, “they accepted only about half of the New 
Yorkers’ specific conclusions in this regard. The entire proposal was justified by the committee 
through reference of the need to make the state more attractive to industry.”30 Therefore, the 
Prentis Commission and the Reed committee softened the recommendations that the New York 
Bureau made and presented amendments that helped the Byrd Organization to consolidate 
power.  
These recommendations won the support of Governor Byrd. In 1928, the Virginia state 
constitution underwent profound transformation. Although most of his constituents seemed to 
accept the changes to the constitution, one group that notably detracted was the anti-Catholic 
Patriotic Order Sons of America. In a letter from State Vice President U. M. Bland to Virginians, 
the organization expressed fears over centralizing authority over the school systems. For 
instance, they were concerned that a Catholic governor or state official could “inculcate in the 
minds of millions of Virginia children the doctrines and teachings of Roman Catholicism which 
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would enable the Roman hierarchy to get complete control of the Commonwealth.”31 But, even 
this criticism did not halt these amendments which surrendered to the Byrd Organization. 
But Governor Byrd set his sights beyond constitutional reform. In addition to the 
reorganization of the state government, Governor Byrd requested that the General Assembly pass 
an anti-lynching law when he brought his recommendations before the legislature. Although this 
recommendation was introduced alongside the request to place a statue of Robert E. Lee in the 
state Capitol building, Byrd’s progressive request deviated his conservative policies. This statue, 
along with many other statues of Confederates in the Virginian State Capitol Building, was 
removed in the summer of 2020, one year before Harry Byrd’s own statue was dismantled from 
Capitol grounds.32 Byrd reminded his Democratic colleagues that this legislation became “one of 
the strongest antilynching laws in the country.”33 However, this legislation was merely a 
bargaining chip with the progressive bloc. 
In the same year, Byrd also asked the General Assembly to fund the Shenandoah 
National Park. The Shenandoah National Park project was a political undertaking that had been 
and would be of particular interest to Harry Byrd for the rest of his career. Byrd seemed to have a 
soft spot for the Shenandoah Valley of his Winchester home. Having raised over one million 
dollars from Virginians for land purchases, Governor Byrd asked the legislature to allocate 
another million “to make possible the establishment of this park.”34 The Shenandoah National 
Park project deviated from Byrd’s fiscal agenda. Especially in his early career, Byrd was 
pragmatic in the policies he supported, and this pragmatism makes it difficult to definitively 
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categorize Byrd as conservative or progressive during his time in the Governor’s mansion. In 
stark contrast to his posture in his later career, Governor Byrd was willing to support progressive 
legislation when the circumstances advanced his broader political agenda.  
The constitutional revisions that could not be pushed through the Virginia General 
Assembly legislatively were decided by the voters in a referendum in 1928. For increased 
likelihood of passage of each individual component there would be three separate ballot 
measures in the referendum. First was the General Resolution which advanced one of the major 
policy priorities of the Byrd organization: debt reduction. It imposed a debt ceiling on the 
Virginia state government to prevent the over-reliance on bonds which Byrd felt had been so 
disastrous in the Virginia government. In addition, it expanded the Virginia Supreme Court, 
allowing the Organization to appoint new justices to the court.  
Governor Byrd’s administration strategically approached the public during its the 
presentation of these constitutional amendments. The 1928 constitutional changes had been split 
into three basic measures. Preceding these measures, Governor Byrd signed into law a 
Government Reorganization Bill in 1927. It enacted all changes to the government which it had 
the authority to accomplish legislatively to gain General Assembly support.35 The rest of the 
proposed amendments were set for a referendum in 1928. It was decided that each of the 
proposed amendments would be voted on separately to increase chances of passing.36 The 
constitutional referendum of 1928 consolidated the power of the Virginia governor, therefore 
bolstering the power of the Byrd organization so long as Byrd could keep a friendly governor in 
power. 
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The second measure was one of the most controversial and therefore least likely to pass 
the General Assembly. The Byrd administration passed tax segregation policy that prevented the 
state government from imposing property taxes, thereby placing the decision to levy property 
taxes solely within the purview of local governments. Southern states opposed levying property 
taxes and tended to hand this unpopular responsibility to the local governments where they could 
be better kept in check by agricultural interests. Virginia led the way in the shift from property 
taxes. As a result, Virginia established itself early on as a frontrunner among Southern states 
resisting governmental norms, and the Byrd Organization tapped into interstate Southern 
priorities when restructuring the Virginia government. Byrd carried these priorities into the 
Senate later in his career. 
And the third “Short Ballot” amendment was the most impactful for the Byrd 
Organization’s control over the Virginia state government. This amendment “left the Governor, 
Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General as offices elected in statewide votes, but eliminated 
statewide elections for Secretary of the Commonwealth, State Treasurer, Auditor of Public 
Accounts, and Superintendent of Public Instruction.”37 This was extremely important for the 
Byrd Organization because it placed appointment of these now unelected department heads in 
the hand of the Governor. Though these changes would not take place until after Governor 
Byrd’s term expired, the Organization maintained control over the Governor’s Mansion for years 
to come, and the greater the appointment power of the Governor’s office the more enticing 
rewards Byrd had for those who operated loyally within the bounds of the Organization. 
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Ultimately, all three of the proposed amendments gained the approval of the voters in the 
referendum.38 This victory shifted the way that Byrd went about politics, with the new Governor-
central state organization in place the Byrd Organization would be able to exert a great deal of 
power over the state politics in the years to come, regardless of the political position Byrd 
himself held. Ultimately, the victories over state organization Byrd scored while he was 
Governor represent Byrd’s liberation from concerns of constituent-based needs. Most statewide 
elections became a rubber-stamp process.  
The Byrd Organization, having fully dominated the Virginia Democratic Party, had no 
reason to fear that Virginians would be able to remove them from power. This seems to be the 
primary reason for Harry Byrd’s shift from a progressive Governor of Virginia to an 
anachronistic obstructionist senator by the end of his career. The results of the 1928 Virginia 
state constitutional referendum were not single-handedly responsible for this shift, but they can 
be seen as the root cause. The Byrd Organization scored another victory when the Democratic 
candidate for Lieutenant Governor and opponent of the 1928 amendments, James Price conceded 
the legitimacy of the amendments. When the Virginia Republican party asserted that the Byrd 
administration had pushed these amendments through without due consideration, Price 
countered: “The so-called short ballot amendments have been the subject of a great deal of 
discussion in this campaign and the charge has been frequently made that they were railroaded 
by a Democratic administration to the detriment of the people of the state. I feel the people of 
Virginia are entitled to know the facts in the case … The procedure was entirely regular and in 
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conformity with the law.”39 Tellingly, Price did not even mention these charges were levied 
against the Byrd administration, but rather “a Democratic” administration. Byrd distanced 
himself from the charges of amending the constitution. 
Byrd’s federal career never truly evolved from his state roots. One scholar asserts that 
Byrd “believed that he was first a Virginian, second a Southerner, and third a United States 
Senator.”40 Byrd’s affinity for regional politics limited his effectiveness in national office. These 
loyalties shaped Byrd’s time in federal government in profound ways. Although it has been 
argued that Byrd lacked power in the Senate, it is clear from a study of the Byrd Organization 
that his power came from his dominance of regional machine politics rather than popular appeal 
or policy advocacy, unlike many other Senators. 
Following the 1928 referendum, further fall-out between the Byrd Organization and the 
New York Municipal Bureau took place. The Bureau had also undertaken an analysis of local 
government in Virginia simultaneously with its report on the state government. This report was 
much harsher than the state report and suggests much more extensive overhauls to the complex 
and disjointed local government system in Virginia in the late 1920s. It characterized the local 
government system in Virginia as “grossly political, careless, wasteful, and thoroughly 
inefficient.”41 Correspondence regarding the findings of the committee is noticeably absent from 
Byrd’s papers, and his name is rarely mentioned in connection to the committee following this 
indictment. Heinemann indicates that Byrd sought to distance himself from the negative results.42 
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Byrd alleged his hands were tied by the state constitution while the local governments were free 
to reorganize. Byrd “demonstrated,” as Heinemann put it, “once again the priority of politics 
over economy and efficiency; Byrd could not afford to alienate the local officials who were such 
an important cog in his machine by reducing their autonomy, regardless of their 
incompetence.”43 By dodging the Bureau’s strong recommendation to reorganize local 
governments, Byrd signaled the Byrd Organization’s shift away from progressive reform-minded 
organization in Virginia which depended on reform-consolidated power for the Organization. 
O’Toole’s assertion that “The bosses were not unanimously or unequivocally opposed to 
progressive ideas” rings true, because this progressivism could be used to consolidate and 
streamline their power in “reforms.” The Byrd Organization leaders’ support for these ideas 
crumbled when progressive ideas extended beyond this purpose.44  
In 1928, Governor Byrd also turned his sights toward national politics, namely the 
presidential election between Governor Al Smith of New York and Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover. As expected, Byrd endorsed Smith as the nominee of the national Democratic 
party and made multiple speeches to Virginia voters during which he supported Smith in the run 
up to November. However, divisions over Al Smith’s Catholicism and Prohibition caused 
intraparty struggles on both sides. In a speech to Virginian voters that aired on the radio, Byrd 
attempted to discourage Virginians from letting their positions on Prohibition entice them to 
waver in their support of the Democratic party.45 He quoted the words of Congressman Leonidas 
Dyer to inspire fear among Virginian voters: 
On November 6th that great engineer-politician, Hoover with the votes of prohibitionists 
and those swayed because of the religious question in the South will drive such a thick 
wedge through the heart of the solid South and their white supremacy slogan that it will 
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blow up their unconstitutional program. … After the solid South has been blown to 
pieces by the Engineer Hoover, our next President, that will be the finish of the 
nullificationists of the South, who have for sixty years violated and prevented the 
enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Then Congress will enact 
enforcement laws that will give millions of Negroes their constitutional rights as citizens 
and place them on an equality with all other races.46 
 
Two factors explain Byrd’s decision to cite Dyer in support of Al Smith. First, the reference to 
the ‘solid South.” At a time when the Democratic party had dominated Southern politics for 
decades, Dyer’s speech instigated real fears that regional differences with the national party 
would see the South slip away from Democratic control. Byrd’s reference to this speech 
encouraged voters to overcome issues they may have had with Al Smith’s candidacy in the name 
of party loyalty. Secondly, the reference to the enforcement of the 14th and 15th Amendments 
stoked white supremacist fears and scared voters into choosing Smith despite his Catholicism. 
Ironically, it was not long before the very issue of the equal rights African Americans drove a 
wedge between Southern Democrats and the national party. Byrd’s subsequent commentary 
explains his views on the role of party politics in the South:  
Heretofore when defeated the shattered lines of the Democratic soldiery have been able 
to rebuild on the solid front preserved by the Southern States. Break that front and there 
will be nothing left on which to rebuild. Worse even, let the national ticket be defeated 
only by the failure to command the support of the solid South and the resentment of the 
main Democratic army will destroy the unity that is essential to future effectiveness of 
the party.47 
 
 Byrd embraced the “solid South” and saw the Democratic party deeply entwined with 
Southern values. Describing the South as a stronghold for the Democratic party, he appeals to the 
historical tradition of Southern support for the Democratic party. He described the South as the 
tripping point for Democratic national party unity. In this speech, he even cited fear of 
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resentment and retribution from the national party. Though his tone changed significantly over 
the course of his career regarding the need for Southern Democrats to simply swallow their pride 
and support the national party, he never openly sided with the Republican party. Though his 
relationship with the national Democratic party deteriorated significantly after he entered 
national politics, one thing remained true throughout his career: for Byrd, Democratic politics 
were the primary foundation of South. 
 Subject to the one-term limit imposed on Governors in Virginia, Byrd left the Governor’s 
Mansion in January of 1930 and was succeeded by John Garland Pollard, an established 
Virginian politician and friend of the organization. In reflecting on the growth and progress his 
administration brought to Virginia, Byrd maintained: “Devastated as we were in the war between 
the stales Virginia is today the richest in net wealth from Texas to Pennsylvania. Since 1870 our 
wealth has increased more than fourteenfold, while Massachusetts, who never felt the tread of an 
unfriendly foot, increased eightfold and Pennsylvania ninefold.”48 This remark reveals two key 
aspects of Byrd’s ideology. First, it is a return to what historian Goldfield describes as the “still 
fighting the Civil War mentality.” Byrd not only regarded “Reconstruction as a courageous battle 
against the despoilers of [Old South Civilization and American constitutional principles]—blacks 
and Yankees alike—that concluded in triumph or Redemption,” but he understood his term as 
governor as “Redemption” from Radical Republicans.49 (Radical Republicans took charge in 
Virginia during the Reconstruction period and were despised by Democrats.) Second, this speech 
highlights that Byrd viewed the progress of his administration in terms of wealth created rather 
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than specific voter-oriented programs. Byrd had given Virginian voters some progressive 
policies, such as the establishment of the Shenandoah National Park, the anti-lynching law of 
1929, and increased funding to the Virginia public school system. However, Byrd’s power in the 
state grew and his reliance on the Organization’s popularity within the Virginia Democratic party 
waned, he would turn his sights away from progressive reform.50  In Senate, Byrd focused on 
maintaining electoral power in Virginia.  
Byrd’s as a Senator 
 After he stepped away from the governor’s office, Harry Byrd took a break during his 
fifty-year political career. Between 1930 until 1933, he returned to his family home Rosemont 
and oversaw the Byrd orchard in Berryville along with the family-owned newspapers. During 
this time, he had a favorite-son nomination thrust on him, briefly putting him at odds with 
Franklin Roosevelt at the 1932 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Before the hotly 
contested primaries in which party politicians had to appeal to the party members of each state to 
secure support at the convention, many states simply appointed delegations to the convention via 
the state’s party committee. In many cases these delegations went into the convention officially 
supporting a prominent state politician who had not officially declared presidential ambitions. 
Although favorite-son nominations were often ceremonial ways of recognizing the leadership of 
prominent state politicians and more attributed to delegate control at the convention than actual 
presidential aspirations, this suggests that Byrd Organization maintained control over Virginian 
politics even when Byrd was not holding any elected office. In acknowledging the favorite-son 
nomination Byrd said on Independence Day, 1932: “I deeply appreciate the partiality shown me 
by the Virginia people and the loyalty of the Virginia delegation. I endeavored to so use this 
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confidence reposed in me as to promote our party success.” He declared, “The Virginia 
delegation at Chicago had mainly at heart the unity of the party.”51 
In 1933, when Claude Swanson resigned his seat in the Senate to become President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Naval Secretary, Governor John Pollard appointed Byrd to fill his seat. 
Byrd had been considering a run against Swanson in the 1934 primary, so it is likely that 
Swanson began looking for positions outside the Senate to avoid going up against the Byrd 
Organization. Thus began Byrd’s thirty years in the United States Senate.  
Because Swanson’s seat was up for reelection in 1934, Byrd had to run in a special 
election in 1933 to remain the incumbent in the 1934. Despite fears of unrest within the state 
Democratic party, the Byrd Organization fared well in the 1933-1934 elections. Initially his 
relationship with President Roosevelt was cordial and concentrated on the United States’ 
economic recovery at the height of the Great Depression. However, the conservative Virginian 
and the liberal president soon confronted stark differences over proposed economic solutions and 
the underlying causes of the Great Depression. 
Senator Byrd was no stranger to economic hardships having passed the days of his youth 
in rural turn-of-the-century Virginia. He blamed debt accrued by the Virginia state government 
for the economic situation in the state. Byrd felt that the anti-debt and reorganization policies he 
put in place as a governor brought industry and economic prosperity back to Virginia. These 
policies were at odds with the progressive government-expansionary New Deal policies of the 
Roosevelt administration. 
Following Harry Byrd’s appointment to the Senate, the Byrd Organization dominated in 
Virginia. Historian Larry Sabato maintains, “politics in the Old Dominion seemed so predictable 
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[in the period from 1933 to 1946] that one wonders how the voters manages to stay awake.”52 
President Roosevelt attempted to destabilize the Byrd Organization’s dominance in Virginia. 
During his 1938 “purge” of conservative Democrats, Roosevelt supported Organization-outsider 
Governor James Price and nominated Floyd Roberts, a liberal Democrat, as a federal judge in 
Virginia. Ultimately, however, the Byrd Organization averted this federally supported “uprising” 
of liberal Democrats through the election of Organization boss Colgate Darden as Governor in 
1941.53  Byrd felt, like many Southern Democrats, he could support Roosevelt’s initial New Deal 
in 1932. Because Southern states depended on the New Deal’s economic aid, they were 
supportive of Roosevelt’s initial proposals. However, as New Deal programs began to address 
African Americans’ needs in the South as well, they attacked the New Deal for being too 
expensive. They stressed liberal Democrats’ break with the national party deflecting from their 
own departure. More immediately, the Organization and Virginian Senators Glass and Byrd were 
able to capitalize on senatorial resentment over the 1938 purges to resoundingly defeat the 
Roberts nomination in 1939.54 
During Byrd’s senate term, he reached consensus with President Roosevelt over 
government reorganization. Having had his successful experience reorganizing the Virginia state 
government, Byrd felt the same principles of government reorganization should hold true for the 
federal government. Roosevelt, however, sought reorganization by governmental expansion 
rather than reduction.55 In July of 1935, the Suffolk News-Herald wrote: “How such a fight be 
avoided with Virginia’s senators openly opposing many New Deal measures is not clear at the 
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moment. The only way out for the organization, it appears, is to endorse the Roosevelt 
administration and acquiesce to Roosevelt’s renomination. Should Senators Byrd and Glass be 
unwilling to face Virginia with an endorsement of the President after opposing his 
administration, a fight for control of the state is inevitable.”56 Byrd and the Roosevelt 
administration’s disagreement came to a particular head when Roosevelt submitted his proposed 
government reorganization plan and said “‘Harry, take it or leave it.’ Byrd replied, ‘Mr. 
President, I will have to leave it.’” According to historian Ronald Heinemann, Byrd objected to 
what he called “mere regrouping” and “predicted that the creation of new departments of social 
welfare spending would be the route to perpetual relief spending.”57  
Throughout the Roosevelt administration Byrd, like many conservative Democrats, 
would have to balance the fine line between opposing his domestic economic expansion and 
supporting Roosevelt’s interventionist stance on international issues. When the United States was 
ultimately thrust into the World War Two, Senator Byrd continued to support American military 
efforts all-the-while criticizing the defense budget. Early in the war preparation process, Byrd 
even threatened to “reveal military secrets so that the American people would know the extent of 
the [funding] dilemma.” This threat came against the urging of almost all of those in his inner 
circle, such as administrative assistant Peachy Menefree and editor of the Richmond News 
Leader Douglas Freeman.58  
The war provided a temporary hiatus to the growing divide between the conservative and 
liberal factions of the Democratic party. Ronald Heinemann explains, “Although court packing 
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and purges weakened the South’s affection for the president, the war produced a reconciliation 
with southern congressmen, who were among FDR’s strongest supporters on intervention and 
mobilization.”59 Roosevelt surrendered from the purge of 1938 and retained conservative 
Democrats, a powerful bloc within the party. According to Heinemann, “With war approaching 
in Europe and national elections pending in 1940 he would not further damage the prestige of his 
administration on patronage fights he could not win. The purge was over.”60 This truce, along 
with bolstered wartime patriotism, would mean relative peace between the Byrd faction and the 
national Democratic party throughout most of the Second World War. However, this unification 
was by no means permanent. Upon Vice President Harry Truman’s assumption of the presidency 
at the close of the war, the divisions within the Democratic party deepened.  
 
“So-called Civil Rights” 
In February of 1948, Harry Byrd quoted Thomas Jefferson in a speech to 1,200 Democrats in 
Richmond. He declared: “The law of self-preservation overrules the law of obligation to 
others.”61 This quote represents Byrd’s philosophical against civil rights. Using the name of a 
Founding Father to justify his position gave Byrd’s philosophy the venire of civic respectability. 
Even though Jefferson’s original context encouraged the use of executive authority in times of 
crisis, Byrd used this quote to attack the Truman administration’s promotion of civil rights 
through the Federal Employment Practices Commission.62 President Harry Truman represented 
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the liberal progressive Democrat that the Byrd Organization had fought to remove in Virginia for 
the past two decades. Truman’s ascension to the presidency only accelerated the rate at which 
conservative Southern Democrats broke ranks with the national Democratic party. Senator 
Byrd’s personal distaste for the policies of the Truman administration became evident in four 
areas: civil rights, the Truman doctrine, labor movements, and fiscal policy. 
 Following the Allied victory of the Second World War, Senator Byrd set his sights on the 
greatest threat to American global supremacy: the Soviet Union. Byrd, a lifelong capitalist, 
abhorred everything Communism stood for and made clear early into the postwar years that he 
felt the United States should bolster its military to maintain strength against Soviet Russia. This 
was one of the few areas where Senator Byrd and President Truman agreed.  
 The rift between Senator Byrd and President Truman saw its deepest discord on the issue 
of foreign aid and domestic expenditures. This split represented an ideological difference about 
how the United States should wield its postwar powers, and to whom the American government 
held obligations. Senator Byrd opposed American investment in rebuilding the economies of 
Europe and felt that the postwar years were the time for the United States to get its own house in 
order fiscally. As Heinemann writes, “Byrd had come to believe that the greatest danger to the 
country’s security came not through military power but through fiscal insolvency; if the Russians 
were to beat the United States it would be through a financial collapse. Moreover, he had little 
confidence that the Europeans could succeed, fearing that the factories rebuilt with American 
money would call into the hands of the Russians.”63  
 Byrd enraged anti-Byrd factions in Virginia with this position as well. His 1952 primary 
opponent Francis Pickens Miller attacked him for opposing almost all Democratic legislation 
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during the Truman administration. Miller’s campaign surrogate Thomas Michie claimed: 
“Senator Byrd, with all his ability, I do not believe to be capable of comprehending in any 
manner the spirit and needs of the day we live in. His votes on foreign policy alone have 
abundantly justified that belief.”64 Byrd was not mistaken in identifying this as a real threat to 
political stability. However, it remains unclear whether the fiscal policies Byrd clung to could 
have provided the United States the necessary credit with which to compete with Russia. Byrd’s 
fiscal conservatism established a precedent of skepticism for non-military, non-essential 
expenditures, especially with regards to foreign aid. Though conservative definitions of essential 
expenditures evolved during and after Byrd’s time in the Senate, Southern conservatism rarely 
allowed foreign aid considerations to outweigh debt and deficit concerns. 
 Byrd often walked a fine line between his fiscal conservatism and support for military 
preparedness. He served on a committee to help establish the Atomic Energy Commission and 
supported the exploration and testing of nuclear technology. However, he was worried about the 
growing price tag of the American military. He feared that, to a large degree, the enormous sums 
the United States government had spent to upkeep the military in the Second World War would, 
much like the “perpetual relief spending” of the New Deal in the Depression, become permanent 
addition to the U.S. federal budget. 
 In a 1950 in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, Byrd insisted on limiting spending. He wrote 
“Our fiscal crisis at home is just as serious as our military crisis abroad. We can’t meet the 
military crisis without a preservation of free-enterprise, mass-production system, and we cannot 
preserve this system in fiscal insolvency… Have we the statesmanship to see the whole picture? 
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To date, the President has failed in this respect to meet his responsibility in the crisis which 
confronts out nation.”65 Such a public attack on President Truman represented a notable low 
point in the relationship Byrd had with the Truman administration. The disagreements between 
Senator Byrd and Truman were not merely short-lived spats, they were indicative of a broader 
split between conservative and liberal Democrats during Truman’s time in office. 
 In addition to his fiscal concerns for the United States, Byrd disagreed with Truman on 
organized labor movements. During the Truman and early Eisenhower years, he tried to curb the 
impact of union power. Senator Byrd was a key figure in drafting the Taft-Hartley Labor Act that 
added restrictions on labor unions and its anti-communist leanings. Senator Byrd held bitter 
sentiment towards John L. Lewis, then president of the CIO and leader of the United Mine 
Workers of America. In his 1950 speech “America’s March Toward Socialism,” Byrd argued: 
“We are now facing a serious crisis in the production of coal. John L. Lewis has been playing 
with the American people like a cat plays with a mouse. He turns on coal one day and turns it off 
the next day but every evening at sundown we have less coal than we did at sunrise. He wants to 
get the country into such a point that we must submit to his demands or great distress and 
suffering, and actual death will come to many of our citizens.”66 In this speech Byrd pandered to 
the fears of conservatives about government and union control, and implied malevolent intent 
among Lewis and the union members. Byrd’s reference to “actual death” shows just how much 
he wanted his audience to believe that Lewis had the power to dramatically alter their way of 
life, and that the right to organize was dangerous because it could result in national economic 
distress. 
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 One of the most significant differences between Byrd and the Truman administration 
emerged over the issue of race and the civil rights plank of the Democratic party platform. 
Southern senators rallied behind Byrd’s office early in 1948 to form a consensus of obstruction 
with regards to all civil rights legislation President Truman might propose.67 Harry Byrd, along 
with many other Democrats or “Dixiecrats” opposed President Truman’s 1948 reelection bid.68 
President Truman faced an uphill battle. According to Heinemann, “From the beginning Byrd 
believed that Truman would drop out in the face of almost certain defeat. Representing Governor 
Tuck at a conference of Dixie Governors he spoke of a potential schism at the national 
convention, implying that Truman could not win without southern support. Enthusiastically he 
encouraged friends in the region to pledge their opposition to the President.”69 
 However, much to the surprise of Byrd, his Southern voters and the nation, Truman won 
re-election in 1948, and the conservative white Southern Democrats failed to gain control of their 
part. The liberal faction had retained its New Deal-era popularity. Headed into the second term 
of the Truman administration, Harry Byrd continued to buck against Truman’s Fair Deal beating 
back civil rights protections, healthcare, education, and infrastructure spending.70 This is 
particularly evident when he admonished the Federal Employment Protection Commission. Byrd 
stated: “The President of the United States had accepted and endorsed the conclusion of the 
committee known as the president’s committee on civil rights. …it is proposed to establish 
another costly, powerful, and inquisitorial bureau of the federal government to send the strong 
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arm of the national government into daily transactions of virtually every man’s private business; 
to tell employers who to hire, who to fire, and who to promote.”71 
The reelection of Harry Truman signaled a shift towards a more liberal national 
Democratic party following the Dixiecrat showdown. Wilkinson maintains, “The New Deal 
years and Truman’s civil rights program reversed the old Democratic notions of white 
supremacy, and the national Democratic party began more and more to woo urban voting blocs 
outside the South. … Virginia political parties did not keep pace with these national shifts but 
generally stood pat along Civil War lines.”72 Byrd began to adopt the obstructionist role that 
defined the rest of his career as well as the modern Republican Party. Byrd was outspoken 
against Truman’s candidacy in 1952 and he was influential in convincing Senator Richard 
Russell to seek the Democratic party’s nomination in Truman’s place.73  Though Adlai 
Stevenson became the Democratic party’s nominee, Senator Byrd’s obstructionism against civil 
rights did not cease after Truman left office.  
Byrd became the subject of pressure to officially break ranks with the Democratic party 
and endorse Dwight Eisenhower in the general election. Mills F. Neal, Chairman of the Virginia 
Democrats for Eisenhower encouraged his supporters to bombard Byrd with telegrams 
encouraging him to “put loyalty to his principles above all else.” Simultaneously, frequent Byrd 
Organization opponent Francis Miller labeled Eisenhower “a Dixiecrat in the South and a 
 
71 “Sen. Byd Attacks ‘Rights’ Program,” Arlington Daily (Arlington, VA), 20 February 1948, Virginia Chronicle: 
Digital Newspaper Archive, https://virginiachronicle.com/?a=d&d=TAD19480220.1.1&srpos=3&e=-------en-20--1-
-txt-txIN-byrd+truman+1948-------. 
72 Wilkinson, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966. 210. 
73 “Senator Byrd Pays Fee for July Primary: Will Seek Election to Fourth Term," Suffolk News-Herald (Suffolk, 
VA), 10 April 1952, Virginia Chronicle: Digital Newspaper Archive,” 
https://virginiachronicle.com/?a=d&d=SNH19520410.1.1&srpos=12&e=--1948---1953--en-20--1--txt-txIN-
truman+fair+deal+byrd-------. 
Allen - Darden 44 
reactionary isolationist in the North.”74 This the rhetoric and results of the 1952 presidential 
election show Byrd was subject to the combined models of Democratic push and Republican pull 
laid out by Quentin, Morris, and Hood. While Eisenhower’s surrogates pressured Byrd for an 
endorsement, Miller cited his refusal to endorse Eisenhower calling him Dixiecrat and 
isolationist which could just as easily have applied to Byrd. 
 
Byrd and the Eisenhower Years 
Senator Byrd’s obstructionism against civil rights did not cease after Truman left office. The 
election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 brought a more conservative executive to the White 
House, and Byrd had a far better personal relationship with the general. President Dwight 
Eisenhower enjoyed a warmer reception from Byrd than most Republicans, and certainly had a 
better relationship with him than Truman did. However, the civil rights issue marred their 
relationship during his time in office court rulings.  
In response to the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, Byrd joined Senators 
Richard Russell of Georgia and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina in drafting the “Declaration 
of Constitutional Principles.” The document asserted that ninety years of harmony had existed in 
American race relations until the Brown ruling which will upset “amicable relations” between 
black and white Americans.75The Southern Manifesto’s disregard for the rights of African 
Americans and false claims about the tranquility of racial relations in the South after the end of 
the Civil War revealed Byrd’s (and the co-signers’) interpretation of the past. By drafting and 
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signing the Southern Manifesto, Byrd signaled a lack of accountability to and disregard for the 
needs of his Black Virginian constituents. The Byrd Organization was kept in power on a 
foundation of white supremacist beliefs. Attempts to destabilize the racial hierarchy in Virginia 
undermined the power of the Byrd Organization and therefore Byrd himself. Just as Byrd could 
not leave the Democratic party and expect to maintain such absolute control of Virginia, the 
Byrd Organization relied on white supremacy to maintain its structure.  
 During President Eisenhower’s authorized intervention during the Little Rock integration 
crisis and federalization of the Arkansas National Guard, Byrd opposed the federalization. His 
role in drafting the Southern Manifesto and support for the massive resistance movement against 
the desegregation of the Virginia public schools demonstrated his departure from the progressive 
elements in the Democratic Party.  
 When the Democratic party embraced civil rights on the national level and created 
opportunities for African Americans during the 1930s, Byrd continued to clamp down on Black 
disenfranchisement in Virginia. Byrd likely feared that Black Virginians would bolster the Anti-
Byrd Organization forces in Virginia as they helped move the party leftward. Not only could this 
wry the party out of the hands of the Byrd Organization, but especially if these factions allied 
with the Republicans in Virginia’s general elections, Byrd feared that they could push many of 
the Old-Guard Organization bosses out of office. 
At the same time Senator Byrd made his voice heard in the national debate on civil rights 
in the wake of the Brown v. Board of Education decision. In what had been termed the “Massive 
Resistance,” Virginian school boards refused to comply with the Brown ruling the Court handed 
down with the full backing of the Byrd Organization and the Virginian state government. Much 
has been written about this period in Virginia’s history, in fact, historians have labeled Byrd an 
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instigator –one of the most widely documented (and criticized) chapters in Byrd’s political 
career. In this chapter of Byrd’s career, he revealed himself to be both a product of his times and 
a catalyst in shaping postwar race relations. The expansion of racial equality in Virginia would 
have upset the entire Byrd Organization’s electoral foundation which had a vested interests in 
seeing African American excluded from the ballot box. Like many parts of the Byrd 
Organization, he would use the tactics of civic exclusion inherited from previous generations 
alongside new attempts to maintain white political supremacy. At a time of shifting racial 
demographics that began to align African American interests with those of the national 
Democratic party, Byrd doubled down on his exclusionary policies because he was not willing to 
risk shifting the foundation of his power in Virginia. 
Byrd, like many white Southern conservatives, embraced political tactics. According to 
Hatch, the “Massive Resistance fight that would forever change the way American political 
debate was conducted. Byrd invented the tag of the ‘Warren Court.’ It was a shrewd political 
gambit, for it seemed to depreciate the Supreme Court from a respected institution to the 
personal instrument of a single man. Right-wing conservatives took up the phrase and Byrd 
himself, really appeared to blame Warren for what he considered malpractice of the Court.”76 
Senator Byrd’s rejection of the Supreme Court decision had lasting effects: it signaled the 
politicizing of the Court and devalued the independent judiciary. In this way, Byrd set a 
precedent for conservative politicians that rejected rulings they opposed as political judicial 
overreach. The Byrd Organization was a regional powerhouse bitterly and hopelessly pushing 
against civil rights justice and popular American sentiment to preserve a dying tradition. It was 
clear that Organization Virginians saw the Brown ruling as another federal mandate that Virginia 
 
76 Alden Hatch, The Byrds of Virginia. 500. 
Allen - Darden 47 
had to nullify. When President Eisenhower used federal force in Little Rock, Arkansas to enforce 
the Supreme Court’s decision in 1957, Senator Byrd was appalled. He labeled the decision “one 
of the most dangerous things that has ever been done in our history.”77  
As he had done before, Byrd framed this as a struggle between the constitutionally 
justified Southerners and an imposing, looming federal government. At the State Democratic 
Convention at Virginia Beach in 1960 Byrd said: “With our backs to the wall, the Southerners 
withstood the power of the federal government, the political pressure of those states appealing to 
the Negro vote, and the propaganda of the facilities available to the NAACP.”78 In his recounting 
of massive resistance to the Virginia State Democratic party, he touted victory in the face of 
growing calls for more civil rights legislation. 
Throughout Byrd’s career in the Senate, he opposed civil rights campaigns. In fact, in the 
final decade of Byrd’s career, he refused to acknowledge civil rights legislation by name, calling 
it “So-Called Civil Rights.” He used this rhetoric with many pieces of legislation he rejected, 
branding them ‘so-called x’ to avoid conceding even the basic purpose of the legislation. He 
would use this same tactic with the “So-Called Voting Rights” Act of 1964 as well as with “So-
Called Medicare.”79 In 1960, when debating “So-Called Civil Rights” legislation in 1960, he 
declared: “To proclaim by Federal law that no employer can express himself anywhere in speech 
or print in dislike of association with Japanese without making himself liable to the charge that 
he has refused to employ Japanese is an outrageous invasion of personal right to which other 
citizens are not subjected.” In this speech, Byrd supported the “personal rights” of established 
employers to speak and write as they wished over the civil rights of economic security for racial 
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minorities in the United States. This moment demonstrates where his definitions of liberty were 
at odds with the notions of civic equality of the liberal wing of the Democratic party. 
He framed the employers as the true victims of the Civil Rights Act. He explained: “The 
survivors of Dachau and Buchenwald are not expected to maintain equanimity and objectivity 
regarding their Nazi oppressors. No one regards it as unwarranted for Jews to dislike association 
with Nazified Germans or with other racial or religious groups that have persecuted them. … 
But, here we have a law proposed which would attempt to deny millions of employers and 
employees any freedom to speak or act on the basis of their religious convictions or deep-rooted 
preferences for associating or not associating with certain classifications of people.”80 The notion 
of victimhood Byrd places on American employers attempted to reverse the narrative of racial 
discrimination in the workplace by presenting employers as forced by a burdensome and 
restrictive act to hire truly deplorable individuals. Byrd’s particular reference to Jewish relations 
with Nazis not only victimized employers by comparing this act to the abuses of the Holocaust, 
but also implied that the average Japanese American was anti-American and part of the Japanese 
Empire. This was obviously untrue and ignored the actual infringements Japanese Americans 
saw on their rights, particularly those who were forced into internment camps during the Second 
World War. 
In the final analysis, Harry Byrd, like so many of his Southern colleagues actively sought 
to maintain power against constituents who had been struggling under what they perceived as the 
“yoke of oppression.” Many of these Southern legislators, like Byrd, had constructed the systems 
of oppression that the national Democratic party was attempting to undo. His contemporaries 
praised Byrd for his integrity and character as a public servant. When writing to Byrd in 1958 
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Associate Justice Carlton Mobley of the Georgia State Supreme Court says “You have rendered 
great service to your state and to the nation, and we the people of the South are particularly proud 
of you and grateful for the contribution you have made during your long tenure in the Senate.”81 
 
“That State of Twilight”: Harry Byrd’s Fiscal Reactionary Nature 
Long before his ardent support of states’ rights in the late 1940s and 1950s, Senator Byrd sought 
to limit the federal power by imposing strict financial constraints on the budget. In this regard 
Byrd was both ahead of his time and behind his time; he had carried his anachronistic views 
from state government into the federal government. Senator Byrd also broke away from the 
Truman administration on fiscal policy. This split reveals two key aspects of his political values 
that are also vital to understanding his continued break from the national Democratic party. In 
the wake of World War Two, Byrd was very reluctant to adapt the fiscal policies he used to gain 
power in Virginia. In refusing to let go of the fiscal accomplishments he made two decades 
earlier in Virginia, Byrd showed that he never truly made the necessary shift from regional to 
national legislator. Although he never acquired the dominance in national politics that he did in 
Virginian state politics, Byrd was able to inject his fiscal views into the national debate and exert 
authority over anti-federal debt policies during his time in office. 
Though Byrd enjoyed a national reputation, his views on race and fiscal issues left him 
behind other Senators. While fiscal viewpoints made him popular in Virginia, they did not 
capture the national imagination. Debt abhorrence worked in Virginia because of the economic 
burden Civil War debt had placed on Byrd’s father’s generation but coming out of the 
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Depression the economic woes of the nation had little to do with government debt and stemmed 
from global market crashes that were not as easy to navigate for the government.82 
 Secondly, Byrd’s fiscal conservatism reflected the rift within the Democratic party which 
did not only polarize Northern and Southern politicians on civil rights issues. In addition, some 
conservative Democrats split with liberals over a far deeper perception of the purpose and power 
of the government. Senator Byrd broke with the fiscal policies of the Truman administration 
early on. He struggled to strike a balance between maintaining American military strength and 
managing federal spending. Byrd believed that Truman’s Fair Deal expansion of welfare 
programs increased debt. Byrd and Truman agreed to raising taxes but split after the contentious 
1948 election that ushered in a rift between Truman and the Dixiecrats.  
It was during this election that Byrd’s unique stance as a Southern Democrat at a time of 
great demographic transition began. Whereas many other Dixiecrats felt that the one-party 
system could no longer serve the needs of both the liberal and conservative Democrats, Byrd 
never fully stepped away from the Democratic party. Byrd remained nominally loyal to the 
Democratic party all the while drifting from them ideologically. Byrd’s hesitancy to embrace a 
third-party system is reflective of the reasons the Dixiecrats ultimately failed. Historian Kari 
Fredrickson explains, “white voters rejected Dixiecrat independence because it did not assure 
effective protection against civil rights legislation, not because they were no longer aroused by 
the politics of race.”83 Byrd never left the Democratic party because doing so would have 
jeopardized his ability to enact segregationist policies in Virginia and across the nation. He never 
accepted the liberalization of the Democratic party. 
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Byrd hoped that a more conservative Democrat might run instead of Truman. While Byrd 
officially stayed above the fray by refusing to endorse any candidate, Governor William Tuck, a 
Byrd organization Democrat would encourage Senator Strom Thurmond to run as an 
independent.84 In addition, the Virginia state legislature passed so-called “Anti-Truman” laws 
which changed the ballot from presenting the name of the presidential candidates to showing the 
names of the electors that would vote for the president. It was against party rules for a Democrat 
to encourage their constituents to vote against the party’s nominee. This bill provided a loophole 
for Byrd’s anti-Truman Democrats in Virginia to exploit which allowed them to encourage their 
constituents to vote for anti-Truman electors, which was not technically encouraging them to 
vote against Truman himself. Byrd inserted Governor Tuck’s remarks on these amendments into 
the congressional record. Heinemann assumes that Byrd originated the idea of this legislation, 
but beyond his obvious personal interest in these bills there is minimal evidence for his direct 
involvement.  It is certainly not impossible to imagine that Byrd devised the idea and allowed 
Governor Tuck to assume credit out of political convenience. Regardless of where the idea 
originated, it is clear that the Byrd Organization was still actively promoting Harry Byrd’s 
interests in state and national politics. 85 
 After gaining a very unexpected mandate from American voters in 1948, President 
Truman would set his sights on carrying on progressive policies by setting out for a “Repeal of 
the Taft-Hartley law and new labor legislation, the farm program, inflation controls, funds to 
continue the Marshall plan and the Civil Rights program, housing, aid to education, and bills to 
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end senate filibusters.”86 But, his bid to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act ultimately failed. Having 
alienated conservative Southern Democratic legislators, Truman was not able to cobble together 
enough liberal votes to end the restrictions on unions. 
 This failed effort set the tone for the fiscal battles of the rest of Truman’s time in office. 
According to Heinemann, “Byrd frustrated the president on several other issues in 1949. 
Offering his first ‘Byrd’s-eye’ view of the government’s fiscal situation, he predicted an $11 
billion deficit over the next three years … this despite the fact that Truman had presented to 
Congress a balanced budget dependent upon a tax increase. … Byrd’s solution was spending 
cut.”87 Perhaps due to the negative relationship that already emerged between the men, the 
government’s budget had grown to such a size that there were few cuts Truman could have 
satisfied Byrd. 
 As Byrd continued to depart from liberal Democrats and presidential administrations for 
the remainder of his career in Senate, he gave speeches at his annual spring picnics called the 
“Byrd’s-eye” during which he focused on the budget and fiscal matters. An invitation to the 
spring picnic signified that an individual was on good terms with Senator Byrd and although all 
presidents after him would, President Truman did not receive invitations to the picnics. 
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Figure 2: Reconciliation88 
 
 There was much that Truman and Byrd bitterly disagreed on, fiscally and otherwise. 
However, during Truman’s second term, they agreed on raising taxes. Figure 2 shows a cartoon 
titled “Reconciliation” which Byrd kept in his files. It shows how he and Truman are trampling 
the public while embracing over taxation. In the cartoon, Byrd and Truman are literally crushing 
“J. Public,” a common personification of the American people, in their embrace over taxation. 
The cartoon portrays Truman and Byrd as spenders of American people’s money regardless of 
the financial burden on the taxpayer or the wishes of the public. In December of 1950, Byrd 
wrote to Truman, laying out his recommendations for the budget: “We have already imposed one 
tax increase of $4.5 billion. The second increase, $3.5 billion in the form of an excess profits 
levy is being enacted now. … These suggestions should be regarded as the point from which 
future reductions should be considered. Even when they are substantially exceeded a third tax 
increase will be an immediate prospect.”89 Byrd’s correspondence with the president detailed 
 
88 Cartoon Collection, Photographs, and Awards, Box H, Papers of HFB Sr. 
89 “Letter to the President,” December 22, 1950, Box 371, Papers of HFB Sr. 
Allen - Darden 54 
reductions in military and government spending. While President Truman ignored most of 
Byrd’s recommendations, the senator convinced the president to support tax increases to balance 
out the federal deficit. By framing the deficit as a national security issue, Byrd concluded that the 
defense budget would be for nothing if the United States became weakened due to reckless 
spending. 
 Initially, Byrd supported the Korean War—another rare point of agreement between Byrd 
and Truman. According to historian Alden Hatch, “Though Senator Byrd fought most of 
President Truman’s program so bitterly, he supported him on the Korean War, and voted for the 
huge military appropriations to carry it on – which is not to say he was happy about it.”90 This 
reveals that Byrd was willing to lay down his penny-pinching approach when he felt national 
security priorities absolutely called for it. President Truman was committed to a “pay-as-you-go” 
approach to Korea and raised taxes to account for the defense budget. The “pay-as-you-go” 
system served as common ground between President Truman and Senator Byrd given Byrd’s 
popular Virginia highway plan. However, they diverged on how to pay for the war. While 
President Truman favored raising taxes in order to maintain many of the New Deal and Fair Deal 
government activities the American people had come to expect, Senator Byrd favored cutting 
government expenditures. 91 Although he believed that significant tax increases could lead to a 
recession, in his 1950 budgetary letter to President Truman, Senator Byrd conceded that tax 
hikes were necessary to balance the budget, and even argued for additional tax increases beyond 
Truman’s proposal. In the end, he stressed that his plan required these tax increases to be coupled 
with drastic “retrenchments in non-essential spending.”92 President Truman would heed some of 
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Byrd’s advice, particularly regarding tax increases, but would largely ignore his advice on the 
budget. In addition, Truman would refute Byrd’s ability to add to the debate on the budget of the 
federal government on the basis that he knew too little about it.93  The relationship between Byrd 
and Truman was continuing to deteriorate over budgetary issues during the final years of the 
Truman administration. 
 Byrd’s support for Korea evaporated toward the end of the war. At a Suffolk-Nansemond 
Chamber of Commerce event he characterized the Korean war “as ‘a catastrophe of the first 
magnitude,’ one in which the United States entered unprepared to fight the ‘second grade’ nation 
of Korea. … The UN faces three alternatives he said – (1) stand and fight, (2) go on the 
defensive or (3) evacuate. It on the latter alternative that he urged on the promise that ‘when the 
situation is hopeless, evacuate and wait for a better day.”94 When Americans turned against the 
Korean war, it seems that after President Truman initially rejected Byrd’s budgetary 
recommendations, he too began to see the Korean war as a liability for undue national debt. This 
reveals that while Byrd often took his fiscal conservatism to extremes, others in his party often 
did not. He was not always alone in his budgetary concerns. Following the Second World War, 
budgetary concerns became a convenient reason for national politicians to dismantle programs 
that lost public support. 
 In 1953, even after Truman left office, Byrd continued to antagonize over the 
administration’s shortcomings in Korea. From his position on the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, he investigated claims by General James Van Fleet that the troops in Korea were 
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severely affected by supply shortages causing a lack of ammunition on the front lines. This 
investigation uncovered that President Truman and the Pentagon decided in 1950 “to reduce 
budgetary shortfalls by cutting back military purchases.”95 Byrd labeled these short fallings 
“criminal inefficiency” and wrote President Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense Charles E. 
Wilson demanding punishment for the military staff responsible.96 
 
The Byrd-Eisenhower Alliance 
Senator Byrd had a much more amicable relationship with Truman’s successor Dwight 
Eisenhower. Although Eisenhower had run on the Republican ticket, party affiliation did not 
prevent a more favorable stance toward the administration. The day after Eisenhower’s election, 
an editorial appeared in Byrd’s paper the Winchester Star which was “sharply critical of 
‘politicians’ who had played as usual in endorsing the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket. It named only 
one Virginian, U.S. Senator A. Willis Robertson but the wording could be interpreted as a 
blanket indictment of all who had stuck with the national Democratic party.”97 At this time Harry 
Byrd’s son State Senator Harry Byrd Jr. (who would go on to succeed his father in the U.S. 
Senate) ran The Winchester Star, so it is likely that this is reflective of Byrd Sr.’s views as well. 
Two aspects about this editorial are of note. First, it did not run until after the election signaling 
that although the Byrds may have personally wanted Eisenhower to win, they were not willing to 
risk enraging more progressive Virginian Democrats by endorsing Eisenhower. Secondly, in 
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criticizing Stevenson Democrats, the Byrds were continuing to build an ideological barrier 
between the national Democratic party and the Byrd Organization. 
Byrd embraced the initial Eisenhower budget that focused on cutting expenditures on 
social programs. Having a more sympathetic conservative in the Oval Office proved useful as 
Senator Byrd’s position to influence the national budget grew. In 1955, due to his seniority, 
Senator Byrd became the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee.98 However, though he enjoyed 
personal friendship with Eisenhower, shortly after becoming chairman of the Finance 
Committee, they disagreed on one issue: the debt ceiling. The Eisenhower administration would 
request a fifteen billion dollar increase in the debt ceiling, which Byrd rejected. Using his new 
authority in the budgetary process, Byrd successfully killed this proposal in committee. 
Throughout his chairmanship of the Finance Committee, Byrd carried a reputation for bottle-
necking bills he opposed.99 
 In addition to his opposition of lifting the debt ceiling, Byrd criticized the way the 
Eisenhower administration proposed to fund the “National Highway Program.” As the pay-as-
you-go-highway advocate, Byrd rejected the adoption of debt to fund infrastructure programs. In 
a statement on the national highway program in 1955, he admonished the Eisenhower Treasury 
Department for attempting to borrow $20 billion dollars outside the debt ceiling to fund the aid 
to states. Byrd proposed an alternative. He believed that Virginia’s pay-as-you go gasoline taxes 
served as a successful model that would allow the government to levy a ½ cent tax on gasoline to 
fund the aid to states rather than borrowing it. This was actually a reduction from the 2-cent 
gasoline tax. Byrd argued that lowering the federal gas tax would “permit the states to reimpose 
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it.”100 This reveals that Byrd not only sought outmoded pay-as-you-go solutions to this huge 
national infrastructure undertaking. He also felt that it should have been within the purview of 
the states decide whether to undertake this infrastructure project at all. Byrd himself even 
advocated for more money to go to “primary, secondary, and urban road systems.”101  Byrd’s 
assessment of state-by-state allocation of interstate funds overlooked the challenges that all states 
faced in building a national highway system without the guiding hand of the federal government. 
Byrd’s fiscal conservatism increasingly overlapped with his social conservatism; his states’ 
rights advocacy was not just aiding social conservatives, but fiscal conservatives as well.  
As the integration crisis in Little Rock raged on, Byrd battled the administration on all 
fronts when he lambasted the 1957 federal budget. Although the 1957 budget did include $1.5 
billion in cuts, Byrd felt that this was not enough and called for an additional $5 billion. 
Although the Eisenhower administration would ultimately get its way in the Little Rock crisis, it 
would lose to Byrd in this battle and concede $4 billion in non-defense cut.102 During the decade 
that witnessed great economic growth and economic recessions, President Eisenhower swung 
back and forth between Byrd’s balanced budget approach and an investment-based infrastructure 
building approach to creating economic stability. 
During the final years of the Eisenhower administration, Byrd restored the relationship 
with the president when presenting a compromise. Heinemann writes, “The recession had 
produced the largest peacetime deficit in American history - $12 billion – encouraging Ike to 
pursue budget balancing with a vengeance. … In return for southern support on budget issues, 
Eisenhower did not push for additional civil rights legislation, except to extend the Civil Rights 
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Commission.”103  While some southern senators opposed the compromise, this was a win-win 
situation for Senator Byrd by securing a balanced budget and a promise that he would not have 
to fight more civil rights legislation. (Even the extension of the Civil Rights Commission was by 
no means a total defeat for Senator Byrd given that former Virginia Governor and Byrd 
Organization member John S. Battle sat on the commission.104)  
Byrd secured compromises from the executive when writing the budget. Byrd’s greatest 
success occurred during a Republican presidency of his legislative career when influencing the 
national budget. This success signaled a shift in the Republican party during the Eisenhower 
presidency, and the increasing isolation Byrd and fellow conservatives became subject to in the 
Democratic party. Senator Byrd and the Eisenhower administration largely parted ways on 
amicable terms. David Kendall, the Special Counsel to the President, wrote to Byrd a few days 
before Kennedy’s inauguration: “The achievement of the balance which President Eisenhower 
has sought between extremes has been greatly assisted, in my judgement, by your knowing and 
high-minded (oftentimes despite serious difficulties) statesmanship.”105 This sentiment displays 
that even Eisenhower officials developed warm feelings towards Byrd. 
 
Byrd’s Clashes with John F. Kennedy 
Although Byrd developed a personal relationship with John F. Kennedy and had supported his 
Vice-Presidential bid over integrationist Senator Estes Kefauver at the 1956 Democratic National 
Convention, he did not want to see him become president in 1960. He again maintained his 
“Golden Silence.” From the onset of Kennedy’s presidency, Byrd feared that diminished power 
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in the Senate would be diminished. For this reason, Byrd was invited by Kennedy to his estate in 
Palm Springs, Florida. Most flatteringly, Kennedy was the first president to attend Byrd’s 
birthday picnic at Rosemont. Heinemann asserts, “Byrd had not been a major player in the 
United States Senate.”106 However, the fact that President Kennedy (a man who had served in the 
Senate with Byrd for the last eight years) felt the need to court Byrd as he did, suggests that Byrd 
wielded at least some influence in the Senate. Although he may not have been the most 
outspoken senator, particularly near the end of his career, by virtue of his seniority and accrued 
political influence, Byrd was able to obstruct aspects of Kennedy’s agenda. 
Kennedy’s fiscal policy was a departure from the Eisenhower’s administration. 
Kennedy’s New Frontier returned to the non-defense expenditures of the Truman and Roosevelt 
administrations. Northern Virginia Sun noted, “President Kennedy’s proposals to put more 
money in the pockets of widows, needy old folks and the jobless workers had such broad appeal 
to voters that GOP congressional strategists were reluctant to take stands against them.”107 
Senator Byrd, however, did not hold back criticism. Byrd opposed many of President Kennedy’s 
proposed legislation during the summer of 1961. Throughout his administration President 
Kennedy grew increasingly tired of Senator Byrd’s arguments over growing the federal budget. 
According to his aide Theodore Sorenson, “He was waiting for the day when an attack on his 
fiscal ‘irresponsibility’ by Senator Harry Byrd would give him an opening to compare Virginia’s 
fiscal record under the Byrd machine with the Federal Government’s.” The Kennedy 
administration kept a chart for just such an occasion which displayed the increase in total debt 
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from 1948 to 1961 of both the United States and the state of Virginia. The U.S. increased 17% 
whereas Virginia increased 864%.108 The fact that Kennedy felt the need to keep numbers 
reminding Byrd to get his own house in order before turning on the administration reveals what a 
nuisance, he was to the administration’s agenda in Congress. It also shows Byrd’s success in 
forcing policies during the Kennedy administration. 
Tax cuts represented a major point of contention between Senator Byrd and President 
Kennedy. Kennedy wanted to cut taxes to stimulate economic growth while Byrd feared that 
decreasing the revenue of the federal government would lead to more debt. Byrd’s opposition 
ultimately contributed to the failure of the 1963 tax cuts. Already sounding weary of his efforts 
in the Senate, Byrd declared, “I have experienced combat fatigue at times; I have taken some 
shell shock; and I am a battle-scared veteran from fighting for the promised New Deal.”109 Here 
Byrd casts himself as the battle-weary Southern soldier valiantly fighting to right the wrongs of 
the South’s parting with the national Democratic party. The reference to the New Deal recalls the 
Southern split from Roosevelt at the beginning of his time in the Senate. Byrd had continued to 
shrink the budget of the federal government and thereby limit the aid given to those most in 
need. Byrd was still fighting for the “original” New Deal at a time when other Democrats like 
Kennedy wanted to expand it. His tone echoes the “Still Fighting the Civil War” mentality 
Feldmann and Godfield ascribe to the South. As Byrd’s final years in the Senate neared, his 
characterization of his own political efforts became another lost cause. 
 
Byrd Surrenders to Johnson 
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Following Kennedy’s assassination in November of 1963, Byrd’s Senate colleague and vice 
president, Lyndon Johnson, assumed the presidency. Building on Kennedy’s New Frontier, 
President Johnson’s Great Society program expanded the budget of the government which Byrd 
protested vehemently. Adding insult to political injury, Johnson’s choice for Vice President was 
Senator Byrd’s long-time Senate rival Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey’s rise to power was 
congruous with Byrd’s fall from grace. In many ways Humphrey was Byrd’s foil, a young 
progressive Northern Senator, versus the aged conservative Southerner.  
 Ultimately, Johnson convinced Byrd to support Kennedy’s proposed tax cuts through the 
Finance Committee in 1964. Known for his strong-arming of legislators, Johnson would summon 
Byrd to the White House shortly after he became president. It seems an aged, and increasingly 
senile Byrd did not put up much of a fight for Johnson. The president insisted, “Harry, I know 
you’re opposed to tax reduction, but I’ve got to have that bill out of committee. We owe it to the 
late president. I know you can’t vote for it, but don’t bottle it up. Will you give me your word 
that you’ll report it out?” asked Johnson. “Lyndon, if you want that bill out, I’ll do nothing to 
stop it.” Byrd replied.110 As Byrd aged, it seems his will to continue the (losing) battle of his 
obstructionism diminished. 
  In one last, largely symbolic act of budgetary constraint, Byrd battled with the Johnson 
administration over the size of the federal budget. Byrd attempted to keep the overall federal 
budget under $100 billion. However, Johnson kept the 1964 budget to almost $98 billion dollars. 
He told Byrd: “Now you can tell your friends that you forced the President of the United States 
to reduce the budget before you let him have his tax cut.”111 Though Byrd did not walk away 
from these budget negotiations with everything he wanted, he seemed to trust that Johnson 
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sincerely aimed to give him what he could. After decades of campaigning for expenditure 
reduction against an ever-ballooning national budget, it seems Byrd’s vigor was beginning to 
wear thin. Byrd ran for reelection one last time in 1964 but understood that his concession 
alienated his political base in Virginia. An aging Byrd clung to out of touch ideals that undercut 
his influence in the Senate.  
 Byrd’s conservative fiscal policies support historian Glenn Feldman’s claim: “the 
American South has shown itself the purest expression of a ‘status quo society’ that Western 
civilization has yet to conjure. In such a society, cultural norms have taken a whole step - or 
more - to the right. Right-wing reaction passes for conservatism, conservatism is moderation, 
centrism is liberalism, liberalism is radicalism and genuine radical alternative is impossible.”112 
Senator Byrd’s fiscal conservatism exhibited trends that date back to the Civil War. Virginia’s 
post-Civil War debt left the state in financial disarray that Byrd sought to recover during his 
career as a governor. And as he dominated Virginia’s political landscape for almost a half-
century, he carried these conservative views into the future and onto the national stage during the 
post-World War Two years.  
 The degree to which conservatives today draw inspiration from Senator Byrd politics and 
methods of politicking, is difficult to determine. However, it is certain that much of the language 
Byrd used to describe government was adopted by his conservative successors. He attacked the 
welfare state as “that state of twilight in which the glow of democratic is fading beyond the 
horizon leaving us to be swallowed up by the blackness of socialism or worse.”113 He feared that 
the strength of the American dollar would collapse: “Once the American dollar goes down, we 
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will all be in an age of international darkness. The American dollar is the only thing holding the 
world together.”114 And, he railed against debt and the deficit: “we are chasing the mirage of 
easy money in the form of deficit dollars.”115 All of these positions framed America as the global 
defender against “socialism” in a way that resonates with the messaging of the conservative 
movements of today. 
Harry Byrd’s life and career served as a guiding force in the transition towards 
conservative Republicanism wading its way toward Southern dominance after his career. Senator 
Byrd’s fiscal policies resonated with white voters across the South, especially in the twenty-first 
century. Following the New Deal, the link between federal aid and federal civil rights protections 
in its relationship with the states shaped white southerners’ attitudes towards “big government” 
which was embraced by President Reagan and the Republican party in the 1980s and onwards.   
Senator Byrd’s view of freedom would leave a lasting imprint on this debate. In many 
ways Byrd saw the government as a servant not only to the people, but to the market. Byrd felt 
that the government’s provision of non-defense services was an infringement on the 
independence and self-reliance required for a healthy free market. He saw it as the duty of the 
government to protect its citizens by keeping schools segregated and prohibiting interracial 
marriages. This particular dynamic of a free market but a regulated society is still a major part of 
the conservative movement in America today.  
 
“Lost Souls”: Byrd’s Final Years in the Senate 
 
In a letter to Byrd, New York Republican and President of Aircooled Motors, Inc. C. F. B. Roth 
encouraged the senator: “You should know that in this area many old line Republicans were 
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delighted to read that you had reconsidered the matter of again serving in the Senate. I am 
confident that his sentiment prevails in many other areas where there are lost souls—old line 
Democrats and Republicans.”116 When Harry Byrd announced that he would not follow through 
with retirement in 1958 and became a candidate, a flood of grateful supporters wrote him to 
congratulate him. Arkansas Republican R. W. Rightsell wrote to him as well: “I read with great 
pleasure, that you had decided to serve us as Senator from Virginia again. I consider you, 
Senator John L. McClellan, President Eisenhower great statesmen and men that we need very 
much to look after our interest.”117 Irving B. Muller of Pennslyvania wrote Byrd saying “I have 
been a Republican voter, Committeeman, and local office holder since 1865, anf [sic] my only 
regret is that I am unable to give you any help as far as a vote is concerned.” Fred Mayer of 
California wrote “I have been a life-long Republican, in the vain hope of belonging to the party 
of conservatism. I would joyfully vote for you for President of the U.S.A.” 
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Figure 3: Letter to Byrd from Thelma Robinson 
Many of these supporters had little reason, on paper, to celebrate Byrd’s continued 
service. Much of the praise for Byrd in 1958 came from out-of-state Republicans who saw him 
as an ally to the conservative cause. California Republican Dr. Themla Robinson wrote “With 
three more years of Eisenhower, I feel very uncertain of our chance to be saved from fiscal 
insolvency and the end of free enterprise in this country. You are just about the only hope we 
have left. Please call directly upon your conservative backing all over the country for a deluge of 
letters whenever you need a response in the course of your fight.”118 Notably Robinson regards 
Byrd as a truer fiscal conservative than Eisenhower. Additionally, the sincere embrace of the 
abhorrence against frivolous spending (of any sort), Robinson’s post scriptum advises: “Please 
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do not take the time or spend the money to answer this letter. I’d rather be able to write and to 
have it no extra burden to your office.”119 Virginia became a swing state where Republicans have 
stood a competitive chance of winning state-wide elections. For many of them, Senator Byrd was 
likely the closest representative to a Republican they felt would carry out their values in Virginia.  
 
Figure 4: “Not Only Virginia, Sir”120 
Figure 3, a cartoon Senator Byrd kept in 1958, offers a powerful visual of Byrd being surrounded 
by pleas to reconsider retirement or letters of gratitude for his decision to stand for reelection. 
This cartoon highlights not only the outpouring of support he received, but also the confusion 
that surrounded the two-week period in which he announced his retirement and subsequently 
announced his reconsideration. What is telling is the speed by which those who heard his initial 
announcement implored him to reconsider. The title “Not Only Virginia, Sir” also accurately 
reflected the range of places Byrd’s correspondents resided. Many were conservatives outside 
Virginia. This indicates the growing support Byrd garnered from conservatives nationwide by 
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the end of his career. In his letter to Byrd, Illinois Republican William Rutherford lamented, “I 
just wish there were a way we northern and southern conservatives could get together, and you 
are the man of men who could solve that problem. Your brand of southern Democrats are the 
kind of people I was raised to respect as northern Republicans – and while I am aware of how 
people in your area feel about Republicans, I am sure you can recognize why it is hard for 
respectable people in this area to think well of northern Democrats.”121 In their missive to Byrd, 
Mr. and Mrs. Harry Schwartz of Oklahoma promised: “We are two Republicans who would be 
the happiest people in the world if we could cast our votes for you for President.”122 These letters 
highlight that Byrd’s fiscal and social conservatism were appealing to a growing national 
audience outside the South in the final decade of his career. In this regard the cartoon “Not Only 
Virginia, Sir” was hardly an exaggeration. It is a testament to the national patronage Byrd’s 
brand of conservatism gained. So many Americans besides his Virginian constituents wrote to 
express their support for his continued service in the Senate, and many had higher office in mind 
for Byrd.  
Senator Byrd’s flirtation with the Republican party would ultimately hark back to his 
extremely difficult relationship with the Truman administration. After the failed Dixiecrat revolt 
of 1948, preparations were already being made for a second Truman run in 1952. (Because of the 
loophole written into the 22nd Amendment President Truman was allowed to seek another term in 
1952 even though he had served more than half of Roosevelt’s fourth term.)  
 However, President Truman would decide not to seek reelection in 1952. Byrd did not 
support the nominee of the Democratic party, Governor Adlai Stevenson of New York. His 
animosity for Governor Stevenson, combined with his admiration for the Republican nominee, 
 
121 William Rutherford to Harry Byrd, February 25, 1958, Box 259, Papers of HFB Sr. 
122 Harry Schwartz to Harry Byrd, Febraruy 26, 1958, Box 259, Papers of HFB Sr. 
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General Dwight Eisenhower led Byrd to step away from the 1952 presidential contest, and move 
toward in-all-but name Republican conservatism. His conservative nature did not outweigh his 
Democratic partisanship during his lifetime, perhaps because of his own perception of the 
Democratic party’s place in Virginian and white Southern heritage. But his evolving views 
pushed him towards forging alliances with Republicans, conservative Democrats and 
Independents alike, or, remain silent.   
 In 1952 Byrd entered a period of “Golden Silence.” He did not endorse Stevenson or 
Eisenhower but stepped back to allow the candidates to compete for Virginia. Though this did 
not explicitly signal his preference, his refusal to use the Byrd Organization to get out the vote 
for Stevenson, and his privately mentioned relief over Eisenhower’s victory, confirmed his 
political leanings during 1952 election. His silence was likely also a product of the political 
dilemma to protect his own interests against long shot candidate Dr. Louise Wensel. His 
encouragement of voters to pick Eisenhower could have resulted in down-ballot slippage towards 
Wensel. Although his split with the Truman administration represented a falling out with the 
national Democratic party, Byrd’s refusal to denounce Eisenhower and support Adlai Stevenson 
was the first tacit nod towards Republican conservatism. Although the Republican party had not 
fared well in state-wide elections after the Bourbon period in the 1880s, Byrd took no election 
victory for granted. 
In addition to his Golden Silence policy and amicable relationship with President 
Eisenhower throughout the 1950s, Senator Byrd established the Virginia Commission on 
Constitutional Government in 1958—another step that brought the Republican Party and Byrd 
closer together. According to George Lewis, “The commission’s chairman, David J. Mays, had 
long been adamant that southern resistance would fail if the region’s segregationists continued to 
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fight the federal government in purely sectional terms. Too many of his segregationist peers, he 
believed, were focusing exclusively on the need to appeal to fellow southerners for support and 
thus were achieving little other than preaching to the converted.”123 Led by Chairman Mays, 
Commission on Constitutional Government expanded its geographic scope by building alliances 
with conservative Republicans in states like Pennsylvania, advancing the segregationist 
movement. Though this initiative was largely unsuccessful, it exposed the increasing ideological 
alignment between Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans. 
 
Figure 5: Cum Laude124 
In 1960, discussions emerged about a new “Constitutional party or Bill of Rights party” 
and Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona as the presidential nominee and Senator Byrd as 
running mate.125 Both senators rejected the idea, but the emergence of the states’ rights rhetoric 
beyond the South was undeniable. Ultimately, Byrd never parted from the Democratic party and 
retired as a Democrat in November of 1965.  Senator Byrd’s political power relied on his state 
Organization in Virginia which helps explain his loyalty toward the Democratic Party.  
 
123 Feldman, Painting Dixie Red, chap. “Virginia’s Northern Strategy,” George Lewis, 100-101. 
124 Cartoon Collection, Photographs, and Awards, Box H, Papers of HFB Sr. 
125 James R. Sweeney, “Whispers in the Golden Silence: Harry F. Byrd, Sr., John F. Kennedy, and Virginia 
Democrats in the 1960 Presidential Election,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 99, no. 1 (1991): 19. 
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Figure 4 shows a cartoon about “graduating” the electoral college. Byrd won 15 electoral 
votes in the 1960 presidential election in Mississippi, Alabama, and Oklahoma. In the cartoon, 
Byrd is pictured saying “An’ I didn’t even take the course!” The cartoon underscores that Byrd 
received non-Virginians votes without having openly campaigned for them. Most of these were 
cast by conservative Democrats who did not see themselves represented by either Kennedy or 
Nixon (see Figure 5). By 1960, Byrd had established a national reputation as a Southern 
conservative. 
 
Figure 6: 1960 Electoral Map126 
In an interview with Richmond Times-Dispatch reporter Jim Latimer about the Byrd 
Organization former Governor Colgate Darden defended the independence of the voter. Latimer 
explained: “There’s a lot of mythology and folklore in Virginia about that time during the Byrd 
Organization era that Senator Byrd would give somebody the nod, or anoint them, or something 
like that.” He asked Darden: “Are you aware of any such thing that happened to you at that 
time?” Darden responded, “No, of course Harry was undoubtedly the leader of the Organization 
and an enormously able leader of the Organization, but I always felt in watching it over the years 
 
126 “Election Results 1960 with Chart.Jpg (3300×2550),” JFK Presidential Library, 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/Election%20Results%201960%20with%20Chart.jpg. 
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… that he made a calculation … coming to the conclusion of who the most likely candidate was 
to win and working around and helping as a result of that.”127 Although Darden may have felt 
Byrd’s nod was a calculation, given the influence Byrd had over his Organization and the 
Democratic party, the nod itself could turn the tides of elections. Byrd’s endorsement was a 
requirement upon which all Democratic candidacies in Virginia depended on for success—a sign 
that conservatism did not rely on party affiliation, but Byrd’s approval. 
The Organization depended on the infrastructure of the Virginia States Democratic party 
for its operation. As much as Byrd may have disagreed with the national Democratic party, his 
regional base of power necessitated the affiliation. Especially if Byrd were to join the Republican 
party, he could not expect the same level of party dominance that he had inherited and expanded 
upon in the Democratic party. The Byrd Organization was built on decades of political machine 
infrastructure within the Virginia Democratic party and abandoning that state party for the 
Republican party would have meant discarding a party system designed to consolidate Byrd’s 
power and starting fresh on the other side. And, of course, they would not be able to guarantee 
that all supporters would follow. Voters on both sides may have seen him as a turncoat and cast 
their lots with anti-Byrd factions in both parties. Harry Byrd only enjoyed one year of retirement 
before he passed away in 1966. His son, Harry Byrd Jr., had already inherited his Senate seat.  
Under his son’s service in the Senate, the Byrd Organization collapsed. Harry Byrd Jr. served in 
the Senate until 1983 as an Independent by 1970. Even in the decade following his death, Harry 
Byrd Sr.’s nominal loyalty to the Democratic party would serve as a barrier preventing his son 
from officially joining the Republican party during his own Senate terms.  
 
127 Jim Latimer, "Living History  Makers: Colgate Darden on Harry Byrd," Library of Virginia, 1975, pub. 2011, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZF3fwDXq1I. 
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The legacy that Harry F. Byrd left behind remains murky. Contemporaries praised him 
for personal character and a gentlemanly nature. However, considering his efforts to subvert 
democracy in Virginia, his Byrd Organization schemes, and his acceptance of systemic racism 
and disenfranchisement, Harry Byrd’s political legacy exposed the hallmarks of modern 
conservatism. In an age of progressive reform and the expansion of government services, Byrd’s 
contribution was to stem the tide of progress. Byrd’s loud obstructionism and later quiet 
resistance to the growing liberalization of the Democratic party perhaps served as a model for 
conservative politicking in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Recently, Harry Byrd’s name made news again in Virginia. After a debate in the Virginia 
General Assembly, a statue of Byrd that had been erected in 1976 was taken down in 2021.128 
Byrd’s legacy as the “architect” of the massive resistance provoked the debate in the wake of 
George Floyd’s death and the Black Lives Matter movement. Black Caucus member and Senator 
Jennifer McClellan said, “When I was an intern in this body … working for the first African 
American Governor and walked past that statue every day I knew I was his worst nightmare.”129 
While Virginia’s modern-day Democratic Party has divorced itself from Harry Byrd’s legacy, it 







128 “Virginia Removes Segregationist’s Statue from Capitol Square,” AP NEWS, July 7, 2021, 
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